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ABSTRACT	
The	advent	of	digital	ICT	has	raised	a	range	of	privacy	problems	that	previously	did	not	
occur,	owing	to	the	scope	and	volume	of	data	that	can	be	collected,	as	well	as	the	
processing	capacity	of	the	applicaAons		These	digital	privacy	problems	are	arguably	
not	easily	addressed	within	any	parAcular	tradiAonal	macroethical	framework.		We	
may	therefore	need	to	ﬁnd	an	alternaAve	approach.	
One	such	approach	is	proposed	by	Luciano	Floridi,	who	has	devised	“InformaAon	
Ethics”	-		a	macroethics	for	the	idenAﬁcaAon,	clariﬁcaAon	and	soluAon	of	digital	
ethical	issues.		While	IE	is	useful	in	that	it	highlights	quesAons	of	digital	agency,	it	will	
be	demonstrated	that	it	is	ﬂawed	when	applied	to	problems	of	privacy	posed	by	
digital	ICT.		IE,	however,	points	us	in	the	right	direcAon:	An	object-oriented	ethics	may	
be	able	to	address	the	issue	of	digital	agents.				
In	this	essay	I	develop	an	argument	for	the	moral	intenAonality	of	digital	agents,	based	
on	the	concepts	of	emergent	value	and		indirect	intenAonality,	that	can	underpin	an	
object-oriented	ethical	approach	to	digital	privacy	for	both	digital	and	human	agents.		
Using	Nissenbaum’s	concept	of	contextual	spheres,	I	provide	normaAve	guidelines	for	
evaluaAng	the	compeAng	interests	of	agent-objects	in	various	digital	spheres.	
A	brief	evaluaAon	of	the	approach,	by	way	of	an	example,	shows	that	the	object-
oriented	LoA	that	I	am	proposing	can	be	adopted	for	digital	privacy	problems.		In	such	
cases,	and	for	the	speciﬁc	purpose	of	weighing	up	the	compeAng	rights	and	values	of	
the	agents	and	paAents,	we	can	treat	all	agents	(human	and	non-human)	as	both	
intenAonal	and	real.		This	provides	a	reading	of	the	case	that	goes	beyond	the	
consequenAalist	or	ownership-based	approaches,	and	arguably	gets	closer	to	the	
heart	of	the	issue.	
Where	the	approach	is	sAll	open,	however,	is	that	we	sAll	have	to	jusAfy	and	balance	
these	interests.		There	is	no	simple	formula	to	apply.		A	need	for	pracAcal	wisdom	or	
Phronesis,	in	the	form	of	a	judicious	weighing	of	moral	interests,	conAnues	to	apply	to	
digital	problems	posed	by	ICT.  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IntroducAon.			
Privacy,	secrets	and	spies	remain	very	much	in	the	news.		The	reverberaAons	of	the	
Wikileaks	diplomaAc	communicaAons	leak	conAnue	around	the	globe.	Legal	acAons	
conAnue	to	ﬂow	from	Edward	Snowden’s	exposure	of	project	PRISM	-	the	secret	NSA	
monitoring	programme	that	records	global	online	and	voice	data.			Far	more	
commonplace	-	and	yet	therefore	more	concerning	-	is	that	proﬁle	data	of	a	range	of	
types	of	persons,	from	“new	parents”	to	“people	with	cancer”,	is	rouAnely	bought	and	
sold	by	corporaAons	(Steel,	2013);	Facebook	conAnues	to	retain	data	that	members	
have	deleted	and	monitor	members	through	the	Like	bu*ons	embedded	into	third-
party	webpages	(BBC	News,	6	August	2014)	and	Uber	has	a	“God	View”	funcAon	that	
allows	some	employees	to	track	the	locaAon	of	customers	who	have	used	its	car	
service	(Rebeiro,	2016).	What	all	of	these	developments	have	in	common	is	digital	
informaAon	and	communicaAon	technologies	(ICT).			
It	seems	that	the	advent	of	digital	ICT	has	raised	a	range	of	privacy	problems	that	
previously	did	not	occur,	owing	to	the	scope	and	volume	of	data	that	can	be	collected,	
as	well	as	to	the	capacity	of	digital	ICT	applicaAons	to	process	a*ribuAve	data	so	as	to	
generate	referenAal	informaAon	proﬁles	of	individuals.		Data	that	we	consider	suitable	
for	public	access	can	be	processed	to	reveal	things	about	us	that	we	might	consider	
private.		This	raises	the	quesAon	of	whether	there	are	morally	signiﬁcant	privacy	
problems	posed	by	digital	ICT	that	should	be	resolved	by	recourse	to	a	macroethical	
framework	speciﬁcally	designed	for	this	task.	
Privacy	problems	posed	by	digital	ICT	are	arguably	not	easily	addressed	within	any	
parAcular	tradiAonal	macroethical	framework.		For	example,	it	is	hard	to	argue	that	
there	are	necessarily	or	even	possibly	bad	consequences	for	me	if	a	government	or	
corporaAon	tracks	my	behaviour	online.	Nonetheless,	the	idea	of	being	traced	in	this	
way	makes	many	people,	at	some	point,	uncomfortable,	parAcularly	where	the	
tracking	is	done	in	order	to	infer	details	about	them	that	they	may	not	have	chosen	to	
disclose	publicly.		This	suggests	that	intuiAvely	there	is	a	moral	problem	with	the	
pracAce.		On	the	other	hand,	deontological	or	rights-based	theories	seem	to	rely	on	a	
concept	of	ownership	of	data,	but	it	is	impossible	to	argue	that	one	owns,	exclusively,	
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informaAon	about	oneself	that	is	already	in	the	public	domain.	
The	challenges	posed	by	ICT	seem	to	leave	us	with	an	ethical	and	policy	vacuum.		It	
can	be	diﬃcult,	using	our	exisAng	theories,	to	reach	a	reﬂecAve	equilibrium	in	which	
we	can	balance	our	acceptance	of	broad	ethical	imperaAves	with	our	moral	intuiAons	
in	parAcular	cases	about	the	privacy	problems	posed	by	digital	ICT.		It	might,	of	course,	
be	that	our	moral	intuiAons	will	evolve,	and	that	privacy	simply	isn’t	a	problem	at	all.	
If	however,	that	is	the	case,	then	we	might	have	to	accept,	logically,	that	there	is	no	
aspect	of	ourselves	and	our	lives	that	should	not	be	disclosed	to	the	public	gaze.		As	in	
the	dystopian	novel,	“Blind	Faith”,	by	Ben	Elton	(2007),	we	will	all	shortly	post	our	sex,	
birth	and	death	videos	online,	and	go	about	more	or	less	naked	in	public	too.		In	such	
a	world	it	is	not	just	the	personal	that	is	intruded	upon,	but	quite	feasibly	the	poliAcal	
as	well.		The	hero	of	“Blind	Faith”	is	in	the	end,	aler	all,	executed	for	his	religious	and	
poliAcal	non-conformity .	1
If	the	quesAon	of	privacy	remains	important,	then	we	need	to	ﬁnd	a	consistent	way	to	
assess	our	moral	intuiAons	about	what	is	morally	permissible	and	impermissible	when	
it	comes	to	breaches	of	our	privacy	by	governments,	corporaAons,	and	other	
individuals	online.	In	other	words,	we	need	an	alternaAve	approach	with	which	we	
can	ﬁll	the	vacuum.	
One	such	approach	is	proposed	by	Luciano	Floridi,	who	has	devised	“InformaAon	
Ethics”	-		a	macroethics	that,	he	suggests,	provides	a	conceptual	ground,	on	the	basis	
of	which	ethical	issues	posed	by	the	advent	of	digital	ICTs	may	be	“more	easily	
idenAﬁed,	clariﬁed,	and	solved”	(Floridi,	2008a,	p.19).	InformaAon	Ethics	(IE)		is	a	kind	
of	environmental	ethics	where,	rather	than	privileging	the	interests	of	humans	(as	in	
classical,	anthropocentric	theories),	we	consider	the	interests	of	the	environment	as	a	
whole.		Furthermore,	in	considering	the	rightness	or	wrongness	of	an	acAon,	we	do	
not	consider	not	only	the	moral	well	being	of	the	agent,	but	the	well	being	of	the	
paAent	–	the	object	of	the	acAon	-	which	in	IE	is	always	a	piece	of	informaAon.		While	
	His	non-conformity	starts	with	his	choice	to	vaccinate	his	child.		If	this	seems	like	is	an	unlikely	source	1
of	opprobrium,	the	recent	fuss	over	Mark	Zuckerberg	choosing	to	vaccinate	his	daughter	gives	pause	
for	thought.(h*ps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/01/11/mark-zuckerberg-
angers-anA-vaxxers-with-photo-of-baby-at-doctors-oﬃce-gepng-vaccinaAons/)
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IE	is	useful	in	that	it	highlights	quesAons	of	informaAonal	versus	psychological	privacy	
and	of	digital	agency,	it	will	be	demonstrated	that	it	is	ﬂawed	when	applied	to	
problems	of	privacy	posed	by	digital	ICT.		IE,	however,	points	us	in	the	right	direcAon:	
An	object-oriented	ethics	may	be	able	to	address	the	issue	of	digital	agents.			By	
object-oriented	I	refer	(following	Floridi,	1999	p.49)	to	an	applied	ethics	which	is	
- not	anthropocentric	or	bio-centric	but	being-	or	onto-centric;	
- neither	only	agent	oriented	nor	only	paAent	oriented,	but	oriented	to	both	-	which	
is	what	Floridi	terms	“object	oriented”;	
- “not	an	ethics	of	virtue,	happiness	or	duty,	but	of	respect	and	care”.	
Digital	ICT	applicaAons	may	demonstrate	a	degree	of	intenAonality	that	is	not	
necessarily	equivalent	to	human	intenAonality	but	which	nonetheless	poses	a	
quesAon	of	moral	import:	Do	digital	ICTs	have	potenAal	moral	intenAonality,	and	if	
they	do,	does	that	mean	that	they	have	rights	and	responsibiliAes	–	and	parAcularly,	
for	the	purposes	of	this	research,	rights	and	responsibiliAes	with	respect	to	privacy?		
Do	we	need	to	consider	the	privacy	rights	of	both	digital	agents	and	other	(human)	
moral	agents?			
I	would	suggest	that	the	answer	to	these	quesAons	is	yes.	In	this	essay	I	will	develop	
an	argument	for	the	moral	intenAonality	of	digital	agents	that	can	underpin	an	object-
oriented	ethical	approach	to	digital	privacy	for	both	digital	and	human	agents,	and	
explicate		further	what	this	object-oriented	approach	looks	like.		By	drawing	on	
Nissenbaum’s	(2004)	concept	of	contextual	spheres,	I	will	then	provide	normaAve	
guidelines	for	evaluaAng	the	compeAng	interests	of	agent-objects	in	various	digital	
spheres.	
What	I	am	not	a*empAng	to	do	here	is	to	provide	a	meta-ethics	(which	is	what	Floridi	
1999)	does	do).		I	am	rather	developing	an	approach	that	can	be	applied	to	a	
parAcular	domain	(that	of	digital	privacy),	based	on	the	construct	of	a	Level	of	
AbstracAon	(as	deﬁned	by	Floridi,	2002),	and	using,	in	addiAon,	the	concept	of	
contextual	spheres .			2
	Of	course,	without	a	prior	knowledge	of	Floridi	and	Nissenbuam,	these	concepts	are	fairly	crypAc,	but	2
In	the	essay	that	follows	I	hope	to	explain,	criAque	and	ﬁnally	apply	them.
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In	order	to	develop	the	argument,	the	essay	will	address	each	of	the	following	
quesAons	in	the	secAons	that	follow:	
1.	What	sort	of	privacy	problems	are	posed	by	digital	ICT?	
2.	Why	can’t	tradiAonal	macroethical	approaches	address	these	problems	for	us?	
3.	Why	isn’t	IE	an	appropriate	theoreAcal	approach?	
4.	Why	is	an	object-oriented	approach	nonetheless	useful?	
5.	How	can	an	object-oriented	approach	be	applied	to	digital	privacy	problems?	
Privacy	Problems	Posed	by	Digital	ICT	
Let	us	consider	more	carefully	why	digital	ICT	poses	parAcular	privacy	problems.		For	
readability,	I	will	henceforth	refer	to	the	privacy	problems	posed	by	digital	ICT	as	
“digital	privacy	problems”.		What	kinds	of	problems	are	these,	and	why	are	they	of	
moral	consequence?	
Floridi	(1999,	p.52)	describes	four	types	of	privacy,	viz.	physical,	mental	(or	
psychological),	decisional	and	informaAonal	privacy.		Physical	privacy	corresponds	to	
freedom	from	sensory	interference	or	intrusion.	This	is	privacy	of	the	body,	essenAally,	
and	relates	to	what	others	can	do	to	or	with	my	body,	whether	through	observaAon	
(where	a	peeping	Tom	would	be	an	intrusion)	or	more	directly	(for	example	through	a	
body	search	or	dog	sniﬀers	at	an	airport	(BonfanA,	2014)).		Mental	privacy	is	freedom	
from	psychological	interference	or	intrusion	–	harm	to	my	percepAons	of	myself	and	
my	relaAon	to	the	world	around	me.			For	example,	an	intrusion	that	reveals	aspects	of	
myself	that	I	would	rather	keep	private		-	perhaps	a	coarse	sense	of	humour,	or	a	
propensity	to	boast	in	private	-		may	well	aﬀect	my	“idenAty,	self-hood,	thoughts,	and	
so	forth”	(Tavani,	2008,	p.162).	 	Decisional	privacy	is	freedom	from	procedural	
interference	or	intrusion	–	such	as	undue	inﬂuence	on	how	I	make	decisions	
regarding,	for	example	educaAon,	health	care,	voAng	choices	or	so	on.			InformaAon	
privacy	is	freedom	from	epistemic	interference	or	intrusion	–	where	facts	about	me	
that	I	would	prefer	to	be	private	become	public.				The	ﬁrst	three	kinds	of	privacy	
relate	to	what	others	can	do	to	me,	whereas	informaAonal	privacy	relates	to	what	
others	know	about	me.			
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Floridi	(1999)	argues	that	only	informaAonal	privacy	is	relevant	in	the	context	of	
computer	ethics ,	because	it	is	only	informaAon	that	can	be	stored	on	digital	ICT,	and	3
therefore	only	informaAon	that	can	be	interfered	with.		However,	a	consideraAon	of	
the	value	of	privacy,	and	the	relaAonship	between	these	various	kinds	of	privacy	
demonstrates	quite	quickly	that	they	are	all	of	concern	in	the	context	of	digital	ICT.	
Privacy	in	itself	is	arguably	not	an	intrinsic	or	core	value	(Moor,	1997,	p.29).		But	it	is	
certainly	instrumental	in	ensuring	some	intrinsic	values,	because	a	violaAon	of	privacy	
can	disturb,	for	example	our	freedom	(if	decisional	privacy	is	breached),	our	
autonomy	(if	decisional	or	mental	privacy	is	breached),	our	capacity	for	human	
relaAonships	(if	mental	privacy	is	breached),	or	even	our	physical	safety	(if	physical	
privacy	is	breached).		InformaAonal	privacy	can	be	said	to	be	important	because	it	in	
turn	prevents	violaAons	of	decisional,	mental	or	physical	privacy,	as	it	may	be	through	
intrusions	on	informaAon	about	me	that	a	party	may	impinge	on	my	ability	to	make	
decisions,	my	autonomy	and	my	bodily	security	or	integrity.		In	other	words,	there	is	
harm	or	disvalue	in	an	epistemic	intrusion	to	the	extent	to	which	it	intrudes	or	
interferes	mentally,	psychologically	or	physically.		It	is	debatable	whether	
informaAonal	privacy	breaches	themselves	are	violaAons,	although	Moor	(1997,	p.29)	
does	argue	that	an	informaAonal	privacy	breach	is	in	itself	a	breach	of	security,	which,	
being	necessary	for	the	survival	of	a	culture,	is	a	core	value.	
It	is	in	order	to	protect	intrinsic	values,	through	the	instrumental	value	of	privacy,	that	
we	have	always	protected	personal	informaAon,	whether	through	walls	and	curtains,	
private	correspondence,	secrets,	conﬁdenAal	relaAonships	and	so	on.		The	need	to	
protect	informaAonal	privacy	is	not	parAcular	to	computer	ethics	or	digital	ICT.		Can	
we	then	say	that	there	are	privacy	problems	that	are	parAcular	to	digital	ICT,	that	
deserve	speciﬁc	ethical	a*enAon	at	all?	
There	are	at	least	two	ways	in	which	digital	ICT	can	be	said	to	exacerbate	privacy	
	Floridi	refers	to	the	ﬁeld	of	ethical	study	in	relaAon	to	digital	ICT	as	Computer	Ethics	or	CE.		This	term	3
is	somewhat	dated	as	the	ethical	implicaAons	of	computers	are	today	wider	than	only	computers	or	
computer	networks	but	include	communicaAon	technologies,	the	internet,	social	media	and	so	on	as	
well	–	as	indicated	by	the	term	ICT.
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issues.		These	relate	to	the	volume	of	data	and	the	type	of	data	that	the	use	of	
technology	creates.		Firstly,	the	sheer	volume	of	data	about	individuals	that	digital	ICT	
now	generates,	transmits	and	stores	has	increased	the	potenAal	for	privacy	violaAons	
to	levels	that	were	inconceivable	even	a	few	years	ago.		As	an	example,	the	acAvist	
Max	Schrems	has	sued	Facebook	to	force	the	company	to	reveal	what	data	it	was	
holding	about	him.	He	discovered	1222	pages	of	informaAon,	including	informaAon	he	
had	deleted	or	not	consented	to	being	shared	(BBC	News,	2014).		Digital	informaAon	
has	a	quality	of	permanence		(Nissenbaum,	1998,	p.562),	which	is	olen	not	obvious,	
or	even	counter-intuiAve	to	the	subjects	thereof.		Because	it	is	so	easy	to	delete	or	
remove	data	from	the	plasorm	on	which	it	is	presented	to	us	–	and	some	programmes	
such	as	Snapchat	even	delete	it	automaAcally	and	almost	instantly	–	it	is	easy	to	
assume	that	it	has	in	fact	been	deleted,	whereas	it	may	well	be,	and	olen	is,	more	
permanently	stored	on	databases	that	are	not	visible	to	us.		Although	we	might	be	
vaguely	aware	of	it,	we	don’t	olen	stop	to	consider	that	a	retail	store,	for	example	
might	have,	in	addiAon	to	shopping	data,	demographic	informaAon	such	as	the	
following:	
your	age,	whether	you	are	married	and	have	kids,	which	part	of	town	you	
live	in,	how	long	it	takes	you	to	drive	to	the	store,	your	esAmated	salary,	
whether	you’ve	moved	recently,	what	credit	cards	you	carry	in	your	wallet	
and	what	Web	sites	you	visit…your	ethnicity,	job	history,	the	magazines	
you	read,	if	you’ve	ever	declared	bankruptcy	or	got	divorced,	the	year	you	
bought	(or	lost)	your	house,	where	you	went	to	college,	what	kinds	of	
topics	you	talk	about	online,	whether	you	prefer	certain	brands	of	coﬀee,	
paper	towels,	cereal	or	applesauce,	your	poliAcal	leanings,	reading	habits,	
charitable	giving	and	the	number	of	cars	you	own.	(Duhigg,	2012	online)	
Secondly,	because	of	the	amount	of	data,	and	the	capacity	of	digital	ICTs	to	process	it,	
data	that	in	another	form	or	context	would	be	a*ribuAve	(about	a	person	generically	
or	persons	in	general),	can	be	processed	very	rapidly	to	become	referenAal	
(speciﬁcally	referring	to	a	parAcular	person)	–	so	that	individually	harmless	
informaAon	becomes	idenAty-relevant,	or	capable	of	causing	harm	(van	der	Hoven	
2008,	pp.307-311).		This	has	become	parAcularly	perAnent	with	the	development	of	
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“Big	Data”	predicAve	analyAcs	systems,	which	can	crunch	data	that	is	publicly	
available	across	a	mulAplicity	of	plasorms,	to	be	able	to	idenAfy	for	example,	when	a	
parAcular	person	is	pregnant,	or	ill,	or	about	to	reAre.	Facebook	keeps	1222	pages	of	
Max	Schrem’s	data	because	it	is	expecAng	it	to	provide	such	potenAally	economically	
proﬁtable	insights.		Nissenbaum	(1998)	refers	to	this	as	the	problem	of	“privacy	in	
public”	–	a	“systemaAc	relaAonship	between	privacy	and	informaAon	that	is	neither	
inAmate	nor	sensiAve	and	is	drawn	from	public	spheres”	(p.559).		The	malleability	and	
transportability	of	electronic	records,	together	with	their	permanence,	enable	data	
surveillance	and	informaAon	harvesAng	that	allow	for	informaAonal	privacy	intrusions	
based	enArely	on	public	data.	
In	spite	of	these	problems,	it	might	be	suggested	that	although	the	scale	of	the	
problem	may	be	bigger,	the	essenAal	type	of	problem	is	unchanged,	and	there	are	in	
fact	no	parAcular	privacy	problems	posed	by	digital	ICT.		If	that	is	the	case,	then	our	
exisAng	macroethical	frameworks	should	suﬃce	in	dealing	with	the	problems.			
Arguably	however,	this	is	not	the	case.			
ConsequenAalist	and	Deontological	Approaches	and	Why	They	Can’t	Consistently	
Address	Digital	Privacy	Problems	
Floridi	(1999),	in	parAcular,	has	argued	that	is	not	possible	simply	to	apply	either	
deontological	or	consequenAalist	macroethical	frameworks	to	digital	ICT	problems.		
According	to	him	(2005,	p.	193)	there	are	two	“popular”	interpretaAons	of	privacy	
that	rely	on	standard	macroethical	frameworks	.		On	the	“reducAonist”	interpretaAon,	
privacy	is	important	because	it	prevents	net	undesirable	consequences	that	might	be	
caused	by	informaAonal	intrusion	or	interference.		In	other	words	there	is	a	rule-
consequenAalist	argument	that	privacy	breaches	in	general	have	moral	disvalue	
because	they	cause	more	harm	than	good.		As	in	any	consequenAalist	evaluaAon	
there	is	of	course	a	potenAal	for	uAlity	as	well	–	for	example	a	parAcular	act	of	
breaching	a	would-be	terrorist’s	privacy	is	good	for	others’	security	–	but	the	extent	of	
the	value	or	disvalue	of	a	privacy	breach	is	assumed	to	be	esAmable.	On	the	
“ownership-based”	interpretaAon,	privacy	is	important	because	informaAon	about	a	
person	belongs	to	a	person,	and	he/she	has	a	right	to	control	it.		This	is	a	rights-based,	
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deontologial	view,	according	to	which	the	freedom,	autonomy,	security	and	other	
basic	rights	of	the	raAonal	individual	as	an	end	in	himself	are	to	be	protected.	
If	either	of	these	views	can	be	successfully	consistently	applied,	then	privacy	problems	
posed	by	ICT,	along	with	other	ethical	ICT	(or	Computer	Ethics)	issues,	do	not	pose	any	
unique	sort	of	problem.		According	to	Floridi	however,	“when	consistently	applied,	
both	ConsequenAalism…	and	Deontologism	show	themselves	unable	to	accommodate	
CE	problems	easily,	and	in	the	end	may	well	be	inadequate”	(1999,	p.39).	
Floridi	(1999)	enumerates	a	number	of	reasons	for	which	he	considers	it	diﬃcult	to	
demonstrate	consequenAal	disvalue	(or	value)	in	ICT	cases.		These	include:	the	fact	
that	there	may	be	no	percepAble	eﬀects	of,	for	example,	Facebook	storing	1000s	of	
pages	of	my	data	without	my	knowledge;	a	percepAon	that	only	“real	life”	has	any	
moral	consequence	and	that	therefore	“virtual”	or	ICT-based	acAons	do	not;	and	the	
impossibility	of	calculaAon	of	the	actual	consequences,	given	the	“constantly	changing	
infosphere”	(p.40).			
All	of	these	parAcular	criAcisms	amount	to	an	argument	that,	in	ICT	cases,	it	may	be	
diﬃcult	or	even	impossible	to	calculate	consequences.		This	epistemological	problem	
applies	of	course,	to	potenAally	all	moral	problems	-	how	do	we	really	know	what	the	
consequences	of	any	acAon	will	be?		For	consequenAalists	however,	such	knowledge	
is	not	necessary	for	the	purposes	of	making	moral	decisions,	because	the	principle	of	
maximisaAon	of	uAlity	(good	consequences),	is	a	criterion	for	whether	the	acAon	is	
morally	right,	rather	than	a	decision	process	or	procedure	in	the	ﬁrst	place.		As	Sinnot-
Armstrong	illustrates	-		“just	as	the	laws	of	physics	govern	golf	ball	ﬂight,	but	golfers	
need	not	calculate	physical	forces	while	planning	shots;	so	overall	uAlity	can	
determine	which	decisions	are	morally	right,	even	if	agents	need	not	calculate	uAliAes	
while	making	decisions”	(2014,	pp.	14-15).			It	is	probably	adequate	rather,	for	
decision-making	purposes,	to	follow	our	moral	intuiAons,	which	intuiAvely	take	
account	of	the	most	important	expected	consequences.			We	can,	aler	all	“have	
strong	reasons	to	believe	that	certain	acts	reduce	uAlity,	even	if	we	have	not	yet	
inspected	or	predicted	every	consequence	of	those	acts”	(Sinno*-Armstrong,	2014,	p.
16).		Where	we	really	cannot	assess	the	consequences,	it	simply	points	to	the	“severe	
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limits	to	our	knowledge	of	what	is	morally	right”,	which	is	not	to	be	unexpected	in	
moral	problems	in	general,	and	therefore	logically	in	ICT-based	problems	too.	
A	further	problem	for	consequenAalism	that	Floridi	(1999)	idenAﬁes	in	ICT	cases	is	the	
potenAal	for	a	diminished	sense	of	responsibility	or	accountability	on	the	part	of	
agents	(p.40).		In	the	case	of	privacy	issues	that	would	amount	to	a	diminished	sense	
of	responsibility	on	the	part	of	the	persons	responsible	for	deciding	to	keep	my	data	–	
given	that	they	don’t	know	me	at	all.		This	certainly	might	explain	why	agents	are	
more	inclined	to	act	unethically	in	certain	circumstances	rather	than	others,	but	it	
does	not,	in	consequenAalist	terms,	jusAfy	their	acAons.		As	Singer	(1972)	famously	
points	out,	we	are	as	morally	obligated	toward	the	distant	as	we	are	towards	those	
who	are	close	to	us,	in	proximity	or	relaAonship	(p.	232).		
With	regards	to	the	“rights-based	view”,	Floridi	(1999)	argues	that	Deontology	is	too	
“inﬂexible”	for	ICT	problems,	and	that	there	are	too	many	conﬂicAng	“rights,	duAes	
and	moral	values”	for	Deontological	approaches	to	be	consistently	applied	(p.39).		
Moreover,	it	can	be	diﬃcult	to	perceive	of	these	rights	as	carrying	any	serious	weight,	
given	the	“ludic	nature”	of	many	digital	interacAons	(Floridi,	1999	p.40).			Again,	these	
are	problems	that	can	be	raised	against	Deontological	approaches	in	general	(a	
discussion	of	which	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	essay).		Suﬃce	it	to	say	that	perhaps	
an	expectaAon	that	any	macroethical	framework	could	“accommodate	CE	problems	
easily”	(p.	39)	is	unrealisAc.		
Nonetheless,	of	Floridi’s	(1999)	objecAons,	the	following	is	probably	the	strongest:		He	
suggests	that	the	anthropocentric	nature	of	Deontology	makes	it	unsuitable	for	
analysing	situaAons	in	which	non-humans	(that	is,	computers)	are	implicated	as	the	
possible	iniAator	of	acAon	(p.40).	In	fact	this	objecAon	applies	to	both	
consequenAalist	and	deontological	approaches.	What	is	the	moral	disvalue	of	Google	
automaAcally	scanning	my	emails	so	that	its	servers	can	send	informaAon	about	me	to	
other	servers?		How	would	anyone	calculate	the	net	value	of	that	acAon?		What	rights	
or	responsibiliAes	do	emails	and	servers	have	anyway?		And	even	if	I	have	a	right	to	
my	own	emails	or	Facebook	posts,	once	informaAon	has	been	generated	from	base	
data	about	me,	I	don’t	own	that	informaAon,	so	can	I	have	any	rights	in	respect	of	it?			
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The	problem	with	the	classic	or	standard	macro	ethical	approaches	is	not	so	much	
that	they	are	strained	by	CE	cases	when	they	are	applied,	but	that	they	cannot	begin	
to	be	applied	to	many	cases	-	they	cannot	account	for	how	we	might	begin	to	hold	
non-human	agents	accountable,	or	concern	ourselves	with	the	consequences	for	-	or	
rights	of	-		non-human	paAents.	
This	then	raises	the	following	quesAon	–	if	consequenAalism	and	deontology	can’t	
account	for	the	moral	import	of	digital	privacy,	then	does	it	have	any	moral	value	at	
all?		Or	should	we	simply	concede	that	there	are	really	seldom	signiﬁcant	
consequences	or	any	real	breach	of	rights	in	breaches	of	privacy	in	the	digital	realm?		
Certainly	policy	diﬀerences	between	the	United	States	and	Europe,	and	the	casual	
aptude	of	most	teenagers	towards	social	media	seem	to	point	to	a	spectrum	of	views	
on	this	–	the	logical	end	point	of	which	will	be	that	the	age	of	privacy	is,	as	Mark	
Zuckerberg	would	have	it,	over	(Kirkpatrick,	2010).	
The	problem	that	we	would	then	face,	however,	is	what	a	completely	transparent	
world	would	actually	look	like.		In	a	completely	transparent	world,	no	informaAon	
about	a	person,	no	communicaAon,	no	detail	of	their	likes,	dislikes,	personal	or	
poliAcal	preferences,	possessions	or	behaviour	would	not	be	made	visible	to	anyone	
who	cared	to	see.		As	pointed	out	by	Rachels	(1975),	this	would	be	a	world	in	which	it	
would	become	impossible	to	form	varied	relaAonships	with	diﬀerent	people	–	I	would	
be	as	transparent	to	the	passenger	sipng	next	to	me	on	the	bus	as	I	am	to	my	closest	
friend.		In	such	a	situaAon	there	would	be	no	such	thing	as	an	inAmate	bond	with	any	
one,	and	our	capacity	for	human	relaAonships	would	be	severely	diminished.	Subject	
to	the	relentless	gaze	of	every	and	any	other,	our	autonomy	is	likely	to	be	severely	
impeded	(Johnson,	1994	cited	in	Moor,	1997),	our	ability	to	“be	one’s	own	
person”	(Christman,	2015,	p.1)	by	deﬁniAon	overtaken	by	the	fact	that	we	are	now	
everybody	else’s.	
It	seems	unlikely	that	anybody	would	want	to	live	in	a	completely	transparent	world.		
Therefore	we	ought	to	have	some	principles	for	privacy	in	the	real	world.		This	is	
precisely	what	we	do	in	our	everyday	pracAce,	where,	except	in	the	most	oppressive	
socieAes,	we	have	the	right	to	speak	or	not,	to	have	conﬁdenAal	relaAonships	of	both	
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personal	and	professional	kinds,	to	cover	ourselves	up	or	reveal	ourselves	to	a	great	or	
lesser	extent	as	we	please.	This	is	not	to	say	that	anyone	has	complete	privacy	any	
more	than	we	have	complete	autonomy	or	freedom	in	the	real	world,	but	certainly	
there	are	degrees	of	privacy	that	we	take	for	granted	and	seem	to	value.	
Undoubtedly,	in	the	twenty-ﬁrst	century,	digital	ICT	has	potenAal	eﬀects	on	our	
existence	in	the	real	world.		These	eﬀects	are	obvious	when	we	interact	with	
individuals	online.		Cyberbullying,	for	example,	even	if	it	is	enArely	virtual,	has	eﬀects	
on	the	real	psyches	of	real	people	and	has	lead	to	actual	suicides	(Megan	Meier	
FoundaAon,	2015).		There	are	also	real	world	eﬀects	of	the	use	of	informaAon	by	
corporaAons.	For	example	Target	(an	American	chain	store)	uses	data	mining	to	
idenAfy	customers	who	are	pregnant,	and	in	one	case	sent	coupons	for	baby	clothes	
to	a	teenager,	whose	family	did	not	know	she	was	pregnant	at	all.		Even	adult	women	
don’t	necessarily	like	the	idea	that	a	corporaAon	is	tracking	their	reproducAve	status	
(Duhigg,	2012	)	and	so	Target	does	not	disclose	to	customers	that	it	is	doing	so,	or	
even	make	it	obvious	that	it	has	–	it	sends	coupons	for	lawn	mowers	along	with	
coupons	for	nappies,	so	that	the	target	markeAng	is	not	obvious.	
Therefore	as	much	as	we	need	privacy	in	the	real	world,	we	also	need	principles	for	
digital	privacy.	If	consequenAalism	and	deontology	in	their	classical	forms	can’t	
provide	principles	that	work	for	digital	privacy	then	we	have	to	ﬁnd	other	principles	
that	will	apply	in	this	context.	In	an	a*empt	to	do	just	that,	Floridi	has	developed	
"InformaAon	Ethics"	(IE)		-		a	macroethics	that,	he	suggests,	provides	a	conceptual	
ground,	on	the	basis	of	which	ethical	issues	posed	by	the	advent	of	digital	informaAon	
and	communicaAon	technologies	(ICTs)	may	be	“more	easily	idenAﬁed,	clariﬁed,	and	
solved”	(Floridi,	2008a,	p.19).	One	of	the	issues	that	he	has	analyzed	is	informaAonal	
privacy,	and	in	parAcular	the	informaAonal	privacy	problems	posed	by	digital	ICT	
(Floridi,	1999	and	2005).	
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InformaAon	Ethics	and	its	LimitaAons	as	a	Macroethical	approach	to	Digital	Privacy	
Problems	
In	this	secAon	I	will	suggest	that	IE	does	not	provide	us	with	an	adequate	means	of	
drawing	moral	disAncAons	between	enAAes,	and	that	therefore	the	moral	laws	of	IE	
are	diﬃcult	to	apply	in	pracAce.		With	speciﬁc	reference	to	informaAonal	privacy,	the	
disAncAon	between	the	informaAon	object,	and	informaAon	about	the	object,	seems	
to	create	similar	diﬃculAes	for	using	IE	as	an	appropriate	theoreAcal	approach	to	
digital	privacy	problems.	
Floridi	(1999),	having	idenAﬁed	the	problems	with	reducAonist	(consequenAalist)	and	
ownership-based	(deontological)	approaches,	proposes	a	theory	that	is	neither	
anthropocentric,	nor	agent-oriented,	but	rather	“infocentric,	and	object-oriented”	(p.
43).		As	menAoned	in	the	introducAon,	IE		is	a	kind	of	environmental	ethics	where,	
rather	than	privileging	the	interests	of	humans	(as	in	classical,	anthropocentric	
theories),	we	consider	the	interests	of	the	environment	as	a	whole.		Furthermore,	in	
considering	the	rightness	or	wrongness	of	an	acAon,	we	do	not	only	consider	the	
moral	well	being	of	the	agent,	but	also	the	well	being	of	the	paAent	–	the	object	of	the	
acAon.		Whereas	environmental	ethics	is	bio-centric	and	paAent	oriented,	Floridi	
suggests	that	in	order	to	deal	with	ICTs	we	need	to	abstract	further	to	be	infocentric	
and	object	oriented.			
This	is	done	by	adopAng	a	theoreAcal	level	of	abstracAon	(LoA)	at	which	all	enAAes	
are	considered	to	be	“consistent	packet[s]	of	informaAon”	(p.	43)	comprising	the	
properAes	of	the	object	and	the	possible	states	and	behaviours	of	the	object	in	
response	to	sAmuli .		All	processes,	at	this	level,	“can	be	treated	as	informaAon	4
processes”	(p.43).		The	totally	of	enAAes	and	processes	(i.e.	the	environment,	or	
everything)	is	the	infosphere.		An	agent	is	“any	enAty	capable	of	producing	
informaAon	phenomena	that	can	aﬀect	the	infosphere”	(p.44).		Entropy	is	any	
“decrease	or	decay”	of	informaAon	leading	to	an	absence	of	content	or	pa*ern	in	the	
	The	relevant	object,	thus	deﬁned,	would	possibly	then	need	to	consist	of	inﬁnite	packets	of	4
informaAon,	since	possible	responses	are	not	necessarily	ﬁnite		(Thanks	to	Dr	Kowalenko	for	poinAng	
this	out).		This	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	the	totality	of	enAAes	(including	their	processes)	equates	
to	the	infosphere,	since	the	infosphere	is	in	fact	everything.
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infosphere	(p.44),	that	is,	“any	process	that	negaAvely	aﬀects	the	whole	
infosphere”	(p.45) .	5
This	descripAve	metaphysical	account	of	the	infosphere	then	becomes	basis	for	a	
macroethics,	as	Floridi	suggests	that	“even	more	fundamental[y]	than	life	and	
pain”	(1999,	p.	45),	being,	which	is	now	understood	as	informaAon,	“has	an	intrinsic	
worthiness”	(p.45).		As	such	welfare	is	determined	in	terms	of	existence.	Any	
informaAon	enAty	(any	thing)	has	a	“right	to	persist	in	its	own	status”	as	well	as	a	
“right	to	ﬂourish”	p.45).		Being/informaAon	is	good	and	non-being/informaAon	
entropy	is	evil.	
There	are	thus	four	moral	laws	in	IE	as	follows:	
1. entropy	ought	not	to	be	caused	in	the	infosphere 
2. entropy	ought	to	be	prevented	in	the	infosphere 
3. entropy	ought	to	be	removed	from	the	infosphere 
4. informaAon	welfare	ought	to	be	promoted	by	extending,	improving	and	
enriching	the	infosphere	(p.	47). 
InformaAon	Ethics	is,	however,	applied	by	Floridi	(1999,	2005)	to	the	quesAon	of	
informaAonal	privacy	not	through	an	applicaAon	of	these	laws	but	through	a	
consideraAon	of	two	ontological	asserAons	that	follow	from	the	infocentric	LoA.	
The	ﬁrst	of	these	is	the	asserAon	that	an	object	and	its	informaAon	are,	in	the	
infosphere,	one	and	the	same	thing.		Therefore	a	person	is	her	informaAon.	An		
instance	of	epistemic	interference	or	intrusion	(a	violaAon	of	informaAonal	privacy)	
that	occurs	because	another	agent	obtains	informaAon	about	the	person	is	therefore	
a	violaAon	of	her	“integrity	and	uniqueness	as	an	informaAonal	enAty”	(Floridi,	2005,	
p.	195)	–	her	very	person.		InformaAonal	privacy	violaAons	therefore	are	akin	to	
kidnapping,	rather	than	thel	-	which	is	how	they	are	tradiAonally	understood,	if	
privacy	rights	derive	from	the	“ownership”	of	one’s	personal	informaAon.		
	Floridi’s	deﬁniAon	of	entropy	is	something	of	a	combinaAon	of	the	informaAon	theory	deﬁniAon,	5
where	entropy	is	“a	measure	of	the	loss	of	informaAon	in	a	transmi*ed	signal	or	message”,	and	the	
deﬁniAon	as	applied	in	thermodynamics,	viz.	a	“measure	of	randomness”	or	“disorder”	(h*p://
dicAonary.reference.com/browse/entropy).
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InformaAonal	privacy,	according	to	IE,	is	therefore	a	“fundamental	and	inalienable”	(p.	
195)	right .		6
The	second	ontological	asserAon	is	that	privacy	is	a	funcAon	of	ontological	fricAon.		
Ontological	fricAon	is	deﬁned	as	“the	forces	that	oppose	the	informaAon	ﬂow	within	
(a	region	of)	the	infosphere”	(Floridi,	2005	p.186).		The	lower	the	level	of	ontological	
fricAon,	the	smaller	the	informaAon	gap	between	enAAes,	and	the	lower	the	level	
informaAonal	privacy	possible.			In	the	digital	world,	level	of	ontological	fricAon	is	
mostly	signiﬁcantly	reduced,	because	the	infosphere	is	being	“re-ontologized”	(p.188)	
as	both	informaAon	and	processes	are	digiAzed.		
Re-ontologizaAon	is	the	process	by	which	“everything”	is	moving	into	the	digital	
realm.		Floridi	(2005,	pp.188:189)	points	out	ﬁve	ways	in	which	this	is	happening:		
Firstly,	the	sheer	volume	of	digital	informaAon	is	vastly	increased	and	increasing.		
InformaAon	that	was	previously	stored	in	analogue	form	is	being	converted	to	digital	
form	through	both	private	and	public	projects,		Google	Books	being	an	example	of	the	
la*er.		Furthermore,	much	informaAon	is	today	only	produced	in	digital	form;	
Secondly,	there	is	an	increasing	homogenizaAon	of	processor	and	processed	
informaAon	when	both	are	digital	-	that	is,		computers	and	microchips	are	producing	
informaAon	and	also	processing	and	analyzing	it,	a	development	which	is	rapidly	
causing	the	Internet	to	become	an	Internet	of	Things,	which	could	contain	50	billion	
objects	by	2020	(Evans,	2011).	Thus,	as	an	every	increasing	range	of	types	of	objects	
(fridges,	cars,	watches)	have	both	increased	computaAonal	power	and	internet	
connecAons,	they	are	capable	of	recording,	processing	and	sharing	informaAon	about	
themselves,	so	that	their	digital	presence	is	as	relevant	as	their	physical	one;	Thirdly,	
there	is	an	evoluAon	of	new	informaAonal	agents	as	humans	become	ever	more	
a*ached	(physically	and	metaphorically)	to	their	enhancing	personal	ICTs.		The	
teenager	lost	without	her	iPhone	is	a	clichéd	example,	the	diabeAc	with	an	automaAc	
insulin	pump	that	closely	mimics	a	healthy	pancreaAc	funcAon	is	a	more	serious	one;	
Fourthly,	where	informaAon	and	processors	are	all	digital,	all	interacAons	are	
“informaAonalized”	into	read/write	or	execute	instrucAons.		In	other	words,	only	
	Floridi	applies	IE	only	to	informaAonal	privacy.6
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digital	acAons	can	be	taken	by	digital	agents	on	digital	informaAon;	And	ﬁlhly	there	is	
a	mutaAon	of	old	agents	into	informaAonal	agents	as	augmenAng	technologies	draw	
us	into	the	digital	world,	where	human	beings	can	be	“present”	in	a	digital	form,	
having	entered	the	digital	world	through	a	mulAplicity	of	interfaces,	gateways,	portals	
and	so	on.		
All	of	this,	Floridi	suggests,	means	that	there	is	currently	an	“unprecedented	migraAon	
of	Humanity	from	its	Umwelt	to	the	infosphere	itself”	(2005,	p.189).		In	this	re-
ontologized	digital	infosphere	-		where	the	level	of	ontological	fricAon	is	so	greatly	
reduced	by	digital	volume,	homogenizaAon,	evaluaAon,	informaAonalizaAon	and	
mutaAon	-		privacy	problems	are	greatly	exacerbated.		InformaAon	about	an	individual	
becomes	so	freely	available	that	the	best	way	for	an	individual	to	protect	her	personal	
self,	in	the	form	of	her	informaAon,	is	to	keep	her	idenAty	data	as	close	as	possible	to	
the	physical	manifestaAon	of	her	being	–	through	biometric	idenAﬁcaAon	(p.198).		An	
idenAty	thief	(which	is	what	a	privacy	intruder	is)	would	presumably	then	have	to	
kidnap	her	physical	person	to	steal	her	idenAty,	rather	than	just	her	data.			
The	quesAon	posed	here	is	whether	IE	consAtutes	an	appropriate	theoreAcal	
approach	to	digital	privacy	problems.		As	Floridi	(2008a)	points	out,	IE	-	being	a	
foundaAonalist	project	-	“is	not	immediately	useful	to	solve	speciﬁc	ethical	problems	
(including	computer	ethics	problems)”	(p.19).	Nonetheless,	it	seems	reasonable	to	
assume	that	IE	would	have	something	to	say	about	privacy	(Stahl,	2008,	p.101),	since	
privacy	is	“directly	linked	to	informaAon	and	access	to	informaAon”	(Stahl,	2008,	p.
101),	and	of	course	Floridi	has	himself	applied	it	thus	(Floridi,	1999,	2005,	2008b).	In	
considering	the	quesAon	we	need	ﬁrst	of	all	to	determine	whether	informaAon	ethics	
provides	an	appropriate	theoreAcal	approach	to	moral	judgements	in	general,	and	
then	to	examine	how	it	informs	consideraAons	of	privacy	in	parAcular.	
The	basic	premise	of	IE	is	that	Being,	understood	as	informaAon,	has	an	intrinsic	
worthiness.		Non-being,	entropy,	is	evil.		As	such,	any	entropy	should	be	prevented.		
Because	the	enAty	and	the	informaAon	that	describes	that	enAty’s	properAes	and	
possible	behaviours/acAons/states	are	one	and	the	same	thing,	entropy	necessarily	
refers	to	the	breakdown	or	destrucAon	of	the	thing	itself,	whether	it	is	abstract	or	
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physical.	This	is	clear	from	the	example	Floridi	(1999)	gives	of	the	boy	who	is	
vandalizing	cars	–	his	“game	is	only	increasing	the	level	of	entropy	in	the	dumping	
ground….he	ought	to	stop	destroying	bits	of	the	infosphere”	(p.54).			
Because	IE	a.	abstracts	to	the	level	of	the	infosphere,	and	b.	says	that	entropy	ought	
to	be	prevented,	not	to	be	caused	and	removed	from	the	infosphere,	it	therefore	says	
that	any	form	of	destrucAon	ought	not	to	occur.		That	seems	to	imply	that	all	enAAes	
are	equivalent	(because	they	are	all	informaAon),	and	that	none	must	be	destroyed.		
This	had	led	Brey	(2008),	for	example,	to	conclude	that	“IE	tells	us	that	we	should	be	
equally	protecAve	of	human	beings	and	vats	of	toxic	waste,	or	of	any	other	
informaAon	object”	(p.112).	
Floridi’s	(2008b)	response	to	this	objecAon	is	to	note	that	IE	does	not	suggest	“some	
dal	idea	about	the	intrinsic	value	of	Shakespeare	versus	Dan	Brown”	but	rather	asks	
us	to	consider	all	informaAon	as	“minimally	and	overridably”	ethically	valuable	in	
itself,	“to	begin	with”	(p.193).		We	must	then	have	some	“general,	basic	and	robust	
principles	in	place”		(p.194)	to	help	us	to	decide	that	human	beings	are	more	valuable	
than	vats	of	toxic	waste,	or	Shakespeare	more	valuable	than	Dan	Brown.	The	problem	
is,	that	at	the	infocentric	LoA	we	don’t	have	such	principles.		We	have	only	the	
principles	pertaining	to	entropy,	and	they	don’t	disAnguish	between	enAAes	at	all.	
Perhaps	the	entropy	principles	themselves	can	help	us	value	compeAng	enAAes.		If	
toxic	waste	destroys	other	enAAes	then	I	suppose	that	the	infosphere	as	a	whole	
would	ﬂourish	if	the	toxic	waste	were	destroyed.	There	are	two	potenAal	problems	
then.		The	ﬁrst	one		is	how	to	calculate	the	overall	level	of	entropy	in	the	infosphere,	
given	that	course	of	acAon.	This	problem	does	not	seem	any	diﬀerent	from	the	
consequenAalist	problem	of	having	to	calculate	the	uAlity	of	an	acAon	–	it’s	just	at	a	
diﬀerent	LoA		(Stahl,	2008,	p.104).	In	that	case	it	is	not	clear	exactly	what	abstracAng	
to	this	level	has	contributed.		The	second	problem	is	what	we	would	do	if	two	acAons	
-	one	ethical	and	one	not	-	were	roughly	equal	in	terms	of	their	respecAve	eﬀect	on	
entropy.		Without	already	knowing	which	acAon	was	ethical	we	would	have	no	way	to	
proceed.		We	are	back	to	assessing	“Shakespeare	versus	Dan	Brown”	in	a	way	that	
might	lead	us	to	destroy	something	worthwhile	to	us.	
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AlternaAvely,	if	no	such	calculaAon	is	necessary	because	the	minimally	and	
overridably	valuable	enAty	is	to	be	overridden	“in	view	of	moral	concerns	formulated	
by	other	macroethical	analysis	at	lower	LoA”	(Floridi,	2002	p.302),	then	it	is	not	
enArely	clear	what	is	gained	by	abstracAng	all	the	way	to	the	level	of	the	infosphere,	
only	to	bounce	back	down	again,	as	it	were.			
Floridi	suggests	that	what	is	gained	is	that	“IE	has	its	own	special	ﬁeld	of	applicaAon,	
CE”	(2002,	p.302),	and	that	that	“IE	has	already	been	fruisully	applied	to	deal	with	…
the	problem	of	privacy”		(2008a,	p.19).		However,	the	fact	that	Floridi	himself	does	not	
seem	to	apply	the	four	moral	laws	directly	to	the	quesAon	of	privacy ,	seems	to	7
suggest	that	the	noAon	of	entropy	has	limited	usefulness	when	considering	
informaAonal	privacy.	It	may	even	be	directly	contradictory	–	if	entropy	is	to	be	
prevented	and	informaAon	welfare	to	be	extended	(laws	0	and	3),		but	informaAon	
ﬂow	(which	is	actually	a	process	of	copying	informaAon,	when	it	is	digital)	needs	to	be	
restricted	for	privacy,	then	privacy	measures	contradict	the	moral	laws.		Free	
informaAon	ﬂow	and	a	complete	absence	of	privacy	would	be	a	good	thing.		In	this	
case,	for	example,	Max	Schrems	would	have	no	jusAﬁable	concern	about	Facebook	
keeping	his	data.		In	fact	Facebook	would	be	morally	obliged	to	do	so,	since	to	delete	
the	data	would	be	to	increase	the	loss	of	data,	or	entropy,	which	is	evil.	
This	leads	me	to	consider	whether	IE	helps	us	to	analyse	quesAons	of	ICTs	and	privacy.		
That	is,	is	it	parAcularly	appropriate	when	applied	to	enAAes	which	are	themselves	
digital	items	of	informaAon	(understood	in	the	regular	sense	of	the	word),	and	
therefore	to	the	protecAon	of	digital	informaAon?	
An	informaAon	object	is	any	enAty,	at	the	level	of	its	informaAon.		That	is,	the	object	
and	its	informaAon	are	conceptually	one	and	the	same	thing.			There	is	an	important	
disAncAon	here,	however,	between	the	“informaAon	object”	and	what	we	normally	
understand	as	informaAon	about	that	informaAon	object.		Let	us	call	the	la*er	
informaAon-about.	Consider	that	informaAon-about	is	generally	understood	to	be	
	I	refer	here	to	the	papers	cited.7
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data	in	some	recorded	form	that	is	meaningful	in	respect	of	some	enAty.		UnAl	the	
data	is	recorded	–	say	in	a	photograph,	or	words	in	a	le*er,	or	details	on	a	form,	or	a	
record	in	a	database,	informaAon-about	simply	doesn’t	exist .		Once	it	does	exist,	it	is	8
then	an	informaAon	object	itself	–	that	is,	it	has	its	own	properAes	and	possible	
states .		So	now	that	object	(the	photograph,	the	form,	the	data	entry)	is	now	its	9
informaAon.		But	can	we	logically	say	that	the	second	object	is	the	ﬁrst	object?		Clearly	
we	can’t.	They	are	two	separate,	although	closely	related,	informaAon	objects.		
The	problem	is	that	Floridi	(1999,	2005)	implies	that	we	should	say	that	they	are	the	
same	when	he	discusses	digital	informaAon,	and	privacy	in	parAcular.			Floridi	is	
concerned	with	informaAonal	privacy	-	“freedom	from	epistemic	interference	or	
intrusion,	achieved	thanks	to	a	restricAon	on	facts	about	S	that	are	unknown	or	
knowable”	(Floridi,	1999,	p.52,	my	italics).			He	says	that	if	someone’s	privacy	is	
breached	because	informaAon-about	them	is	interfered	with,	then	that	is	akin	to	
kidnapping	because	the	person	is	her	informaAon.		“Cloned	informaAon…	is	a	part	of	
the	observed	herself”	(Floridi,	2005,	p.195).			Therefore,	the	nature	of	the	informaAon	
breach	is	irrelevant	because	it	is	a	breach	of	the	person	herself	-	the	“packet	of	
informaAon”	(Floridi,	1999,	p.53)	that	she	is.			For	Floridi	privacy	is	nothing	less	than	
the	defence	of	the	self,	because	“any	informaAon	about	ourselves	is	an	integral	part	of	
ourselves”	(p.53)	-	and	at	the	infocentric	LoA	he	means	this	literally	and	not	
metaphorically.			
I	would	argue,	however,	that		the	person	is	only	her	own	semanAc	informaAon,	even	
at	the	level	of	the	informaAon	object.		She	is	not,	even	at	the	infocentric	LoA,	idenAcal	
to	the	informaAon-about	herself.		Common	sense	tells	us	that	informaAon	about	
ourselves	may	not	even	be	correct	–	it	may	be	outdated	or	simply	erroneous	-	in	
which	case,	for	Floridi,	it	is	not	actually	informaAon	at	all.		Even	if	we	were	able	to	
	The	excepAon	to	this	may	seem	be	direct	observaAon.		However,	even	a	human	being	directly	8
observing		another	human	being	forms	perceptual	beliefs	with	a	semanAc	content	-	informaAon-about	
that	person.		If	casual	observaAon	(in	public	spaces)	necessarily	allows	us	to	access	informaAon	that	
amounts	to	a	violaAon	of	a	person’s	integrity,	then	we	all	need	to	close	our	eyes	(and	ears).
	Even	a	record	in	a	database	corresponds	to	a	parAcular	physical	conﬁguraAon	of	atoms.		It’s	not	9
necessarily	immediately	obvious,	but	it	is	a	physical	object	as	such.		And	of	course	it	doesn’t	need	to	be	
a	physical	object	to	be	an	informaAon	object.
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upload	the	enArety	of	our	informaAon	to	a	digital	reader	of	some	kind,	it	would	be	out	
of	date	within	microseconds	as	our	biological	and	psychological	makeup	are	not	ﬁxed.		
InformaAon-about	ourselves	simply	cannot	be	co-existenAally	equivalent	to	ourselves.			
It	is	intuiAvely	appealing	to	understand	that	privacy	is	somehow	an	intrusion	on	our	
idenAty,	and	the	closer	the	informaAon-about	is	in	relaAon	to	the	informaAon	object,	
the	more	this	is	likely	to	be	the	case.			A	diary,	in	which	I	reveal	my	closest	secrets	-	the	
ones	that	might	otherwise	only	exist	in	the	informaAon	object	that	is	me	-	may	reveal	
me	to	the	reader	as	much	as	if	she	had	been	able	to	read	my	mind.			So	in	that	sense	
the	idea	of	the	informaAon	object	is	useful,	because	it	might	help	us	to	idenAfy	the	
kinds	of	informaAon	that	might	warrant	privacy	protecAon.		But	an	insistence	that	a	
person	is	her	informaAon,	and	that	that	parAcular	existenAal	informaAon	is	itself	
intruded	on	by	accessing	informaAon-about	the	person,	simply	can’t	be	true.		
The	kinds	of	informaAon-about	a	person	that	are	closest	to	her	idenAty	(that	is,	the	
informaAon	object)	are,	it	seems	to	me,	the	kinds	of	informaAon	that,	if	intruded	
upon	might	violate	her	mental	or	psychological	privacy,	because	there	is	a	clear	sense	
in	which	some	informaAon	(how	I	feel	about	my	partner)	can	be	more	psychologically	
private	than	other	informaAon	(the	public	fact	that	he/she	is	my	partner).		Tavani	
(2008)	has	noted	that	“based	on	what	Floridi	says…it	would	seem	that	his	disAncAon	
between	informaAonal	privacy	and	mental	privacy	breaks	down”	(p.162).			I	would	
suggest	that	an	alternaAve	interpretaAon	would	be	to	say	that	IE	in	fact	does	not	
account	adequately	for	informaAonal	privacy,	because	it	is	actually	directed	to	
quesAons	of	idenAty,	or	psychological	privacy.				This	is	supported	by	Floridi’s	(2008b)	
comment:	“in	the	sense	that	‘to	be	is	to	be	an	informaAon	enAty’…	there	is	a	
conAnuum	between	the	informaAonal	nature	[the	being]	of	an	individual	and	his	or	
her	mental/psychological	privacy,		…where	one	decides	to	draw	a	threshold…is	
probably	a	ma*er	of	circumstanAal	agreement”	(p.199).			
The	challenge	to	IE	here,	is	that	it	precisely	does	not	deal	with	circumstanAal	or	
contextual	ma*ers,	whether	these	be	the	quesAon	of	whether	mental	privacy	is	
intruded	upon	by	a	parAcular	informaAon-about	intrusion,	or	whether	a	person	ought	
reasonably,	in	the	circumstance,	to	have	to	expected	privacy	in	the	ﬁrst	instance	
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(Tavani,	2008,	p.163).		The	quesAon,	again,	is	how	far	we	can	explore	issues	of	privacy	
at	the	infocentric	LoA,	if,	in	the	end,	we	need	to	consider	contextual	realiAes	anyway.				
Furthermore,	if	IE	has	limitaAons	in	exploring	issues	of	informaAonal	privacy	in	
general,	then	it	is	not	clear	how	it	will	be	appropriate	in	exploring	privacy	problems	
posed	by	ICT	in	parAcular.		These	problems	arise	from	the	reducAon	in	ontological	
fricAon	that	digital	ICT	produces,	but	this	ontological	fricAon	relates	to	informaAon-
about	informaAon	objects,	and	not	necessarily	the	original	informaAon	objects	
themselves.	
A	ﬁnal	objecAon	to	IE	as	a	basis	for	a	theory	of	privacy	in	the	digital	age	is	that	Floridi	
seems	to	use	the	term	“infosphere”	in	ambiguous	ways	depending	on	whether	he	is	
discussing	the	metaphysics	of	IE,	or	the	quesAon	of	informaAonal	privacy	in	the	digital	
age.			
On	the	one	hand,	IE	speciﬁes	that	the	infosphere	“is	Being	considered	informaAonally,	
as	simple	as	that”	(Floridi,	2008,	p.200).		On	the	other	hand,	Floridi	(2005)	says	that	
“the	re-ontologizaAon	of	the	infosphere	has	been	causing	an	epochal,	unprecedented	
migraAon	of	humanity	from	its	Umwelt	to	the	infosphere	itself”		(p.189).		Since	the	re-
ontologizaAon	of	the	infosphere	refers	to	processes	of	digiAzaAon,	it	does	not	seem	
unreasonable	to	suggest	that	the	infosphere	to	which	humanity	is	migraAng	is	now	
the	digital	infosphere.		The	problem	is	that	this	somehow	leaves	the	rest	of	the	
infosphere	(the	Umwelt)	behind.	
Take	for	example,	the	asserAon	that	“in	the	re-ontologized	infosphere	…where	there	is	
not	ontological	diﬀerence	between	processors	and	processed,	interacAons	…are	all	
interpretable	as	read/write	acAviAes	with	‘execute’	the	remaining	type	of	
process”	(Floridi,	2005,	p.188).		Such	a	re-ontologized	infosphere	simply	doesn’t	
include	non-digital	agents	who	do	things	such	as	hug	their	children.		“Hug”	is	neither	
read	nor	write,	and	even	if	one	were	to	suggest	‘execute	hug’	as	an	interacAon,	that	
sAll	requires	‘hug’	as	a	process	itself,	and	one	that	requires	a	non-digital	presence	to	
boot.			Perhaps	it	is	not	all	that	unreasonable	of	Capurro	(2008)	to	suggest	that	in	this	
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case	the	‘infosphere’	is	conceived	as	“separated	from	what	phenomenologists	call	the	
‘life	world’”	(p.170).		
What	implicaAons	does	this	ambiguity	have	for	Floridi’s	theory	of	informaAonal	
privacy?		I	think	that	Floridi	(2005)	is	overstaAng	when	he	suggests	that	the	infosphere	
is	being	re-ontologized.		It	simply	isn’t	the	case	that	processor	and	processed	are	now	
all	digital,	and	unAl	the	enAre	physical	world	is	both	uploaded	and	physically	erased	it	
cannot	be.		What	this	means	is	that	signiﬁcant	ontological	fricAon	exists	between	the	
informaAon	objects	that	take	physical	form	(for	example	humans)	and	digital	
informaAon	objects.	Anyone	who	has	tried	to	access	data	in	a	format	that	is	no	longer	
supported	by	her	computer	can	tell	you	this.			Even	if	data	are	accessible	they	are	
olen	no	longer	current,	and	even	if	they	are	current,	they	are	necessarily	informaAon	
objects	in	their	own	right	–	informaAon	about	another	enAty,	not	actually	that	enAty	
themselves.	I	suspect	that	a	(probably	overly	conﬁdent)	sense	of	this	ontological	
fricAon	might	be	what	makes	digital	naAves	sanguine	about	the	protecAon	of	their	
privacy	online.			
In	conclusion,	Floridi	seeks	to	develop	a	macroethics,	a	theory	that	can	underpin	
consideraAons	of	what	we	ought	to	do	in	parAcular	circumstances.		The	theory	relies	
on	a	methodological	LoA	that	is	itself	coherent,	but	that	is	arguably	not	enArely	
helpful	in	addressing	parAcular	moral	problems.		With	regard	to	quesAons	of	privacy,	
the	disAncAon	between	the	informaAon	objects	and	informaAon-about	objects	
detracts	from	the	appropriateness	of	IE	as	a	theoreAcal	basis	for	considering	digital	
privacy	problems.		
Object-OrientaAon	and	Embedded	Moral	Value	-	or	Why	an	Object-Oriented	
Approach	is	Nonetheless	Useful.	
IE	is,	however,	useful	because	it	may	point	us	in	the	right	direcAon.		That	is,	an	object-
oriented	ethics	may	be	useful	if	it	addresses	the	issue	of	digital	agents.		
An	object-oriented	ethics	would	be	one	that	is	not	human-agent	centric,	but	one	
which	adopts	a	level	of	abstracAon	at	which	all	potenAal	agents	–	human	and	digital	–	
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are	considered,	without	reducing	them	all	to	the	level	of	informaAon,	but	by	
considering	them	all	as	potenAal	agents	and	paAents.	In	this	secAon	I	will	develop	an	
argument	for	the	intenAonality	(not	personhood )	of	digital	agents	that	can	underpin	10
an	object-oriented	ethical	approach	to	digital	privacy	for	both	digital	and	human	
agents.				
Embedded	and	Emergent	Values	
The	ﬁrst	step	in	this	argument	is	to	establish	whether	digital	agents	are	capable	of	
producing	consequences	of	value	or	disvalue	which	are	not	wholly	predetermined	
when	the	programmes	are	developed	in	the	ﬁrst	instance.		In	other	words,	do	digital	
agents	embody	emergent	values,	independently	of	the	intenAons	of	the	designer,	if	at	
all?	
An	inﬂuenAal	paper	regarding	values	and	computer	technology	is	“Values	in	
technology	and	disclosive	computer	ethics”,	in	which	Philip	Brey	(2010)	argues	that	
computer	technologies	have	embedded	values.		There	is	of	course	an	extended	
literature	on	this	topic,	some	of	which	I	will	reference	in	the	discussion	that	follows,	
but	it	is	useful	to	follow	Brey’s	(2010)	parAcular	argument	for	embedded	values.		
Brey	argues	that	technologies	have	built-in	consequences,	which	he	deﬁnes	as	
“recurring	consequences	that	manifest	themselves”	in	“all	central	uses	of	the	arAfact”	
(2010,	p.	44).	These	consequences	might	be	intended	by	the	designer	(for	example,	
that	the	saw	cuts	wood),	or	not	(for	example,	that	the	car	emits	fumes),	but	if	the	
technology	tends	to	produce	them,	then,	he	argues,	they	are	built	into,	or	embedded	
in,	the	technology.	
Brey	then	considers	the	quesAon	of	value.		He	argues	that	“to	ﬁnd	something	valuable	
is	to	ﬁnd	it	good	in	some	way”	and	therefore	that	“values…correspond	to	idealized	
qualiAes	or	condiAons	in	the	world	that	people	ﬁnd	good”	(2010,	p.46).		In	this	sense	
	To	argue	for	personhood	would	require	that	digital	agents	are	raAonal	beings	capable	of	self-10
percepAon	and	self-directedness.		While	one	might	argue	that	digital	agents	have	the	potenAal	to	be	
persons	in	this	way,	or	that	they	are	virtually	so,	this	is	not	yet	the	case,	and	doesn’t	need	to	be	for	an	
argument	in	favour	of	moral	intenAonality	to	hold,	as	I	hope	to	demonstrate.
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“values”	are	abstract	ideals	such	as	jusAce,	democracy,	autonomy	and	so	on.		To	the	
extent	that	the	embedded	consequences	of	a	technology	produce	actual	condiAons	or	
qualiAes	that	are	good	(or	bad),	therefore,	the	technology	embeds	the	corresponding	
value.	
This	is,	as	Brey	notes,	a	causalist	concepAon	of	embedded	values	–	the	technology,	in	
a	recurring	manner,	through	the	central	use	of	the	technology,	causes	the	good	or	bad	
condiAon	to	occur.		As	such,	it	makes	real	or	present	the	corresponding	value	(2010,	p.
47).		Whether	the	value	is	embedded	because	of	the	pre-exisAng	preferences	of	the	
designers,	or	because	of	technical	constraints,	or	because	of	the	way	in	which	the	
system	turns	out	to	be	used	(Friedman	and	Nissenbaum,	1996),	it	is	that	which	is	
caused	-	the	outcome	-	that	is	a	realizaAon	of	the	embedded	values.	
The	quesAon	then	arises	as	to	whether	computer	technologies	in	parAcular	are	prone	
to	recurring	consequences	that	produce	condiAons	of	value	or	disvalue.	
To	the	extent	that	computer	technologies	can	operate	autonomously	–	that	is,	without	
immediate	operaAon	by	the	user,	Brey	argues	they	are	capable	of	engendering	“their	
own	consequences”	(2010,	p.45).			That	these	consequences	can	be	more	or	less	good	
or	bad	-	of	value	or	disvalue	-	he	illustrates	by	way	of	example.		Systems	that	show	
bias,	or	undermine	user	autonomy,	or	limit	freedom	of	informaAon,	or	favour	the	
powerful	(2010,	pp.48:49),	have	embedded	disvalue	in	themselves,	and	therefore	we	
need	to	evaluate	the	ethics	of	the	technology	itself,	“largely	or	wholly	independently	
of	actual	uses	of	the	system”	(2010,	p.41).	
Such	embedded	values	are	olen,	according	to	Brey	not	immediately	evident.		That	is,	
the	technology	is	morally	opaque,	rather	than	morally	transparent.		This	is	parAcularly	
the	case	for	informaAon	technologies,	where	the	operaAon	of	the	technology	is	olen	
at	a	distance	,	as	well	as	technically	complex,	and	more	signiﬁcantly,	closed	oﬀ	from	
the	user,	or	“black-boxed”	(2010,	p.51).		So,	while	it	is	generally	understood	how	
hammers	and	guns	and	even	technologies	like	venAlators	funcAon,	it	is	olen	not	
understood	by	the	user	how	computer	hardware	and	solware	funcAon.		And	if,	for	
example,	we	don’t	know	the	technical	details	of	how	facial	recogniAon	solware	
operates,	then	we	won’t	know	that	it	has	a	built-in	technical	tendency	to	recognize	
!23
people	with	darker	skins,	which	means	that	it	may	have	an	embedded	(although	
unintended)	value	of	racial	discriminaAon	(Introna,	2005).	
This	argument	-	for	built-in	consequences	of	technology	-		is	in	opposiAon	to	the	
neutrality	thesis,	which	states	that	there	are	“no	inherent	consequences	to	
technological	artefacts”	(Brey,	2010	p.43).		On	such	a	thesis,	a	tool	may	be	used	for	
any	purpose	to	which	the	user	puts	it.		A	hammer	may	be	a	murder	weapon,	a	gun	or	
a	collector’s	item.		Because	the	tool	has	no	agency,	it	cannot	be	said	“do”	anything,	
and	therefore	the	consequences	of	its	use	are	not	inherent	in	the	tool,	but	in	the	use	
to	which	it	is	put.		The	responsibility	for	such	use	rests	with	the	user.		Therefore,	there	
is	no	need	to	consider	the	tool	itself	at	all;	we	need	only	concern	ourselves	with	the	
pracAces	of	the	user.			
A	focus	on	pracAce	and	use	is	generally	associated	with	what	Brey	(1997)	refers	to	as	
“strong	social	construcAvism”		-	a	posiAon	that	says	that	technology	is	to	be	explained	
only	through	“reference	to	social	pracAces”		(Brey,	1997,	p.61).		On	a	strongly	
construcAvist	view,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	“real”	object,	independent	of	the	social	
construcAon	of	that	object.		A	piece	of	metal	a*ached	to	a	piece	of	wood	is	only	a	
hammer	because	we	have	socially	constructed	it,	through	use,	as	such.		Therefore	
there	can	be	no	real,	inherent	or	intrinsic	properAes	or	consequences	of	the	object.		
The	object	itself,	as	well	as	the	consequences	thereof,	will	always	be	the	outcome	of	a	
process	of	interpretaAon	and	se*lement		–	a	“genuine	social	construcAon”	(Brey,	
1997,	p.6)	of	reality.		It	is	this	posiAon	that	leads	“strong”	social	construcAvists	such	as	
Grint	and	Woolgar	(1995,	p.306)	to	argue	that	
[t]he	poliAcs	and	values	of	technology	result	from	the	gaze	of	the	
human;	they	do	not	lie	in	the	gauze	of	the	machine.	.	.	.	What	the	
thing	is,	even	what	its	exact	capabiliAes	and	eﬀects	are,	is	not	
something	that	any	kind	of	detached,	objecAve,	or	realist	analysis	
seems	capable	of	construcAng.		
Such	a	strong	view	directs	our	a*enAon	enArely	away	from	the	properAes	of	the	
technology	(the	gauze	of	the	machine)	to	the	use	thereof.		Thus,	as	Messerly	(2007,	p.
19)	argues,	“medical	ethicists	don’t	focus	on	the	design	of	venAlators,	but	on	the	
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pracAce	of	euthanasia”.		Most	of	what	Brey	(2000)	refers	to	as	“mainstream	computer	
ethics”		(p.10)	does	the	same,	focusing	on	issues	of	policy	and	use,	and	not	on	the	
design	of	the	technology.	
Such	a	strong	view	of	the	neutrality	of	technology,	however,	does	not	necessarily	
accord	with	our	moral	intuiAons.		We	talk,	for	example,	of	“beaAng	swords	into	
ploughshares”,	because	we	understand	that	there	is	something	about	a	sword	as	such	
that	not	only	makes	it	unsuitable	for	ploughing,	but	also	speaks	to	a	potenAal	for	
violence.	
Is	there	a	way	to	allow	for	the	fact	that	technologies	can	be	interpreAvely	ﬂexible	
(swords	can	be	used	decoraAvely	or	ceremoniously),	but	at	the	same	Ame,	have	
intrinsic	properAes?		As	Brey	sets	it	up,	we	cannot	give	credence	to	the	neutrality	of	
technology	as	soon	as	we	allow	that	some	technologies	have	built-in	consequences	
from	their	central	uses.		In	such	a	case,	we	must	focus	on	the	sword	as	a	weapon	–	on	
the	technology	itself.		In	Brey’s	own	argument	however,	there	is	sAll	a	connecAon	
between	use	and	consequence	–	the	built-in	consequence	comes	from	the	central	use	
of	the	technology.			He	argues	that	as	soon	as	a	technology	comes	to	be	used	in	a	
parAcular	way,	it	acquires	parAcular	built-in	consequences.			In	fact	“built-in”	is	
completely	misleading,	as	it	implies	that	embedded	consequences	have	to	be	there	
from	the	start,	whereas	Brey	himself	points	to	the	fact	that	they	can	be	emergent	-	
that	is:	“not	necessarily	a	reﬂecAon	of	the	values	of	the	designers”,	but	arising	when	
the	“context	in	which	the	system	is	used	is	not	the	one	intended”	(p.50).		Therefore,	I	
don’t	see	how	Brey	can	get	away	from	use	to	focus	only	on	the	technology	–	to	
propose	an	“ethics	of	computer	systems	separate	from	the	ethics	of	using	computer	
systems”	(p.41	emphasis	in	original).		But	I	also	don’t	see	why	he	needs	to.	
Only	“strong	social	construcAvists”	completely	disavow	the	properAes	of	the	
technology	itself	as	being	relevant .		“Mild	social	construcAvists”	will	consider	how	11
properAes	of	a	technology	contribute	to	“social	shaping”	(Brey,	1997,	p.6).		And	
construcAvists,	such	as	Latour	(1991),	argue	that	a	disAncAon	between	“social”	and	
	And	“strong”	social	construcAvism	is	a	posiAon	that	not	many	sociologists	of	technology	will	hold	to	11
these	days	in	any	case	(thanks	to	Dr	Kowalenko	for	this	point).
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“technical”	is	not	helpful,	and	that	human	and	non-human	agents	co-consAtute	
technologies	in	the	ﬁrst	place.	The	sword	is	a	sword	because	it	is	sharp	and	strong	and	
used	for	assailing	people.		Such	an	account	does	not	discount	use,	any	more	than	it	
discounts	the	properAes	designed	into	the	tool.					
ConstrucAvists	acknowledge	that	a	tool	is	precisely	a	tool	because	it	is	designed	with	a	
parAcular	task	in	mind.		In	order	to	be	used	successfully	as	such,	it	must	engage	the	
user	in	a	parAcular	way.		Latour	(1992,	p.255)	refers	to	this	as	the	technology	
“enforcing	its	script”	on	the	user,	to	produce	a	network	(Latour,	1991,	p.129)–	human	
and	non-human	agents	working	together	to	eﬀect	an	outcome.		Of	course,	this	isn’t	
always	the	outcome	that	the	designer	had	in	mind	–	scripts	can	be	rewri*en	or	
translated	(Akrich	and	Latour,	1992	p.264).			What	we	need	to	do,	in	order	to	properly	
evaluate	the	technology,	is	to	consider	the	actor-network	–	the	human/machine	
artefact	as	a	whole.		If	we	do	this,	then	we	can	allow	for	ﬂexibility	in	use,	without	
discounAng	the	embedded	consequences	of	the	technology.		When	we	do	this,	we	
must	understand	that	“technology”	does	not	refer	solely	to	the	technical	arAfact,	but	
to	the	human/machine	artefact	(what	Haraway,	1991	calls	a	“cyborg”).		Perhaps,	
although	it	really	isn’t	clear,	this	is	indeed	what	Brey	(2010)	means	by	“computer	
systems”	(p.41).		Indeed,	arguably,	he	must	mean	this,	as	very	few	sociologists	of	
technology	would	account	for	a	computer	system,	except	as	a	socio-technical	system.			
For	the	purposes	of	an	object-oriented	ethics,	we	can	then	conceive	of	this	
construcAvist	view	as	a	Level	of	AbstracAon	at	which	all	agents	–	human	and	non-
human	–	operate.		It	is	not	even	necessary	to	argue	for	the	ontological	“reality”	of	the	
actor-network	–	although	Latour,	being	a	realist	(Latour,	1999,	p.1),	would	strongly	do	
so.	
Assuming	we	can	at	this	LoA	allow	for	embedded	-		but	almost	always	in	some	way	
emergent	-	consequences	of	technology,	then	does	it	follow	that	values	are	embedded	
in	the	technology?		Brey	does	not	give	a	parAcularly	thorough	account	of	what	he	
means	by	“values”.		What	we	can	discern	from	his	account	is	that	values	reﬂect	a	
certain	concepAon	of	the	good,	that	they	are	plural,	and	that	they	“correspond	to	
idealized	qualiAes	or	condiAons	in	the	world”.			While	the	correspondence	of	value	to	
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ideas	of	“good”	and	“bad”	(Schroeder,	2012),	is	probably	uncontenAous,	value	
pluralism,	and	the	choice	of	parAcular	values	without	some	sort	of	theoreAcal	
argument	for	them,	are	not.	
However,	holding	to	one	side	for	the	moment	what	we	might	consider	as	valuable	or	
not,	can	we	accept	that	some	value	or	values	might	indeed	be	embedded	and	
emergent	in	technologies?		By	this	I	mean	that,	de	facto,	values	result	from	design,	
use	and	context	of	the	technology,	which	are	more	or	less	stable	at	a	point	in	Ame,	
although	subject	to	interpreAve	ﬂexibility	(Orlikowski,	1992)	and	therefore	translaAon	
and	reinscripAon .		If	we	accept	the	noAon	that	technologies	have	embedded	and	12
emergent	consequences,	as	a	results	of	scripts	that	are	wri*en	into	the	design	and	
rewri*en	or	translated	in	the	use	of	the	technology,	then	it	seems	valid	to	suggest	
that	we	can	evaluate	these	consequences	to	see	if	they	are	good/bad,	be*er/worse	
(Schroeder,	2012).		If	the	embedded	consequence	is	good,	then	we	can	argue	that	it	
has	value.	If	it	is	bad,	we	can	argue	it	has	disvalue.		This	value/disvalue	can	surely	be	
said	to	be	embedded	in	the	technology.		
I	would	suggest	that	we	could	not	feasibly	argue	that	technologies	never	have	
consequences	that	are	arguably	good	or	bad	-	we	would	then	have	to	accept	that	
technologies	only	have	consequences	that	are	always	and	un-controversially	neutral.  		
Messerly	(2007)	seems	to	think	this	is	possible.		He	asks,	incredulously	it	seems	to	me,	
“do	people	really	believe	their	solware	was	designed	to	bring	about	social	change?”				
(p.21).		But	he	is	missing	the	point.		Firstly,	solware	is	designed	to	bring	about	social	
change,	because	it	is	designed	to	change	pracAce.		One	might	ﬁnd	the	change	
unobjecAonable	to	the	point	that	one	doesn’t	even	really	noAce	it,	but	that	doesn’t	
mean	it’s	not	there.		Secondly,	there	are	enough	examples	of	negaAve	and	posiAve	
outcomes	to	make	it	evident	that	the	consequences	of	technologies	are	not	neutral.	
	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	there	is	unlimited	interpreAve	ﬂexibility,	or	that	the	technology	is	not	12
ulAmately	grounded	in	a	physical	reality,	which	constrains	which	values	can	be	embedded	and	
emergent.		But	to	focus	only	on	that	physical	reality,	or	on	the	iniAal	intenAon	of	the	design,	is	to	ignore	
the	factual	emergence	of	alternaAve	scripts,	which	does	actually	occur.			For	examples	of	alternaAve	
scripts	in	the	use	of	ATMs	for	example,	see	Introna,	L.D.	and	Whi*aker,	L.	(2006)	Power,	Cash,	and	
Convenience:	TranslaAons	in	the	PoliAcal	Site	of	the	ATM,	The	Informa6on	Society,	22,	pp.325–340.
!27
Therefore,	technologies	must	have	embedded	values	of	some	kind,	although	not	
everyone	might	agree	what	these	are.	For	a	person	who	values	non-discriminaAon	
above	safety,	facial	recogniAon	systems	that	discriminate	have	disvalue	embedded	in	
them.		For	someone	who	values	safety	above	non-discriminaAon	they	have	value	
embedded	in	them.		But	they	cannot	be	completely	neutral,	or	they	would	not	be	put	
to	use	in	the	ﬁrst	place .			13
To	the	extent	that	digital	ICTs	embed	these	emergent	values,	can	they	then	be	said	to	
embody	a	non-human	agency	that	produces	outcomes	of	value/disvalue?		This	idea	
requires	both	a	consideraAon	of	agency	in	general,	and	moral	agency	in	parAcular.		
While	in	the	broadest	sense,	anything	that	causes	an	outcome	can	be	said	to	be	an	
agent	(Schlosser,	2015),	we	generally	construe	agency	as	the	the	exercising	of	a	
capacity	to	act.		Given	that	digital	ICTs	can	both	act	and	produce	acAons,	are	they	
arguably	potenAally	arAﬁcial	agents?			
Grodzinsky,	Miller	and	Wolf	(2008)	suggest	that	an	arAﬁcial	agent	is	“a	nonhuman	
enAty	that	is	autonomous,	interacts	with	its	environment	and	adapts	itself	as	a	
funcAon	of	its	internal	state	and	its	interacAon	with	the	environment”	(p.	116).	This	
deﬁniAon	seems	to	apply	to	many	digital	ICTs,	but	does	not	address	the	quesAon	of	
intenAonality,	which	on	the	standard	deﬁniAon,	is	required	for	agency.		For	the	
purposes	of	this	argument,	I	am	going	to	assume	however,	for	now,	that	digital	ICTs	
are	indeed	potenAally	some	kind	of	arAﬁcial	agent,	holding	oﬀ	a	discussion	on	
intenAonality	unAl	a	later	point.			
Assuming	then,	that	digital	ICTs	are	agents,	the	quesAon	follows	as	to	whether	
outcomes	of	moral	value/disvalue	necessarily	imply	that	the	digital	agent	is	a	moral	
agent.		
	Furthermore,	because	these	values	are	emergent	and	embedded,	they	are	also	to	a	certain	extent	13
dependent	on	the	parAcular	context	of	use	of	the	technology.		This	may	seem	like	a	relaAvist	posiAon,	
but	in	fact	what	is	mutable	is	the	technology/context/use	actor-network,	not	the	assessment	of	value/
disvalue,	and	so	I	would	suggest	that	this	is	not	a	relaAvist	argument	to	make.		That	context	is	crucial	is	
important,	however,	and	will	be	discussed	in	detail	later	in	this	essay,	with	reference	to	Nissembaum’s	
contextual	spheres.	
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Moral	Agency	
Agency	can	be	generically	understood	as	the	capacity	to	act	(Himma,2009),	but	it	is	
immediately	obvious	that	not	all	agency	is	necessarily	morally	signiﬁcant.		My	cat	acts	
when	it	catches	a	mouse,	but	I	would	not	necessarily	want	to	a*ach	moral	signiﬁcance	
to	that,	although	I	might	feel	sorry	for	the	mouse	and	there	are	clearly	consequences	
to	the	acAon	(being	of	value	to	the	cat	and	disvalue	for	the	mouse).		What	makes	
agency	morally	signiﬁcant?		How	can	we	deﬁne	“moral	agency”?	
As	Himma	(2009)	argues,	the	“standard	account”	of	criteria	for	moral	agency	suggests	
that	deliberaAon	and	free	will,	and	therefore	consciousness,	are	necessary	and	
suﬃcient	condiAons	for	an	agent	to	be	held	morally	accountable	for	her	behaviour.	
Himma	(2009,	p.19)	begins	by	deﬁning	an	agent	as	someone/something	which	can	do	
something	or	cause	a	performance	(i.e.	act)		in	a	purposeful	or	intenAonal	manner.		
Some	kinds	of	doing	are	not	intenAonal,	even	for	humans	-		for	example:	breathing,	
growing	or	digesAng	food.		While	these	acAons	have	the	broader	purpose	of	keeping	
us	alive	they	are	not	acAons	which	we	directly	iniAate	or	cause.			We	cannot	decide	
not	to	breathe	(not	for	very	long	anyway),	grow	or	digest	food	once	it	is	eaten,	any	
more	than	we	decide	to	do	these	things.			
AcAon	or	acAng,	in	contrast,	is	a	special	kind	of	doing,	one	that	has	an	intenAon	-	for	
example:	typing,	walking,	drinking	coﬀee.		To	do	something	purposefully	requires	an	
intenAonal	mental	state	-	I	have	to	think	about	typing	in	order	to	type ,	or	decide	to	14
have	a	cup	of	coﬀee	in	order	to	drink	it.			Therefore,	Himma	(2009,	p.20)	concludes,	
“only	beings	capable	of	intenAonal	states	can	be	an	agent.”		Even	my	cat	must	think	
about	the	mouse,	at	some	cat-level	of	thinking,	in	order	to	catch	it.			
Moral	agency	however,	means	that	the	agent	is	governed	by	moral	standards	and	
therefore	has	moral	obligaAons.		A	moral	agent	is	accountable	for	whether	her	acAons	
	A	touch	typist	of	course	does	not	actually	think	about	the	individual	acAons	of	typing,	but	the	overall	14
acAon	of	typing	a	document	(for	example	a	research	report),	is	deﬁnitely	one	that	requires	purpose	and	
intenAon.
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meet	or	don’t	meet	those	moral	obligaAons.		Himma	(2009,	p.22)	suggests	that	to	
hold	an	agent	accountable	is	to	give	her	what	is	deserved	-	praise,	blame,	punishment,	
reward	-	as	a	consequence	of	her	acAons.		A	moral	agent,	therefore,	is	one	that	can	
raAonally	be	praised,	blamed,	punished	or	rewarded	for	her	acAons.			It	is	not	raAonal	
to	blame	a	cat	for	catching	a	mouse .	15
According	to	Himma	(2009)	there	are	two	condiAons	required	for	such	desert	to	be	
raAonal.	Firstly,	it	is	not	raAonal	to	hold	an	agent		responsible	for	an	acAon	unless	she	
has	freely	chosen	that	acAon.		If	I,	for	example,	steal	a	car	because	someone	
threatened	my	life	unless	I	did	so,	I	am	surely	not	blameworthy	for	the	thel?		The	
person	who	threatened	me	is	the	one	who	deserves	the	blame	and	punishment .		16
Free	will,	therefore,	is	a	necessary	condiAon	for	moral	agency.	Since	free	will	requires	
choice,	and	choice	requires	deliberaAon,	the	capacity	for	deliberaAon	is	also	a	
necessary	condiAon	for	moral	agency.	
Secondly,	it	is	also	not	raAonal	to	hold	an	agent	morally	accountable	for	her	acAon	if	
she	did	not	understand	the	rightness	or	wrongness	of	that	acAon	when	she	(freely)	
chose	it.	Therefore	the	capacity	for	moral	reasoning		is	a	necessary	condiAon	for	moral	
agency.	Moral	reasoning	means	that	the	agent	understands	moral	concepts	and	basic	
moral	principles	and	can	apply	these	to	the	speciﬁc	case.	
Free	will,	deliberaAon	and	moral	reasoning	all	require	not	only	that	the	agent	has	an	
intenAonal	mental	state,	but	also	that	the	agent	has	access	to	that	mental	state.		To	
freely	choose	to	do	something	means	that	I	am	aware	that	I	am	doing	it.		I	have	to	
hold	in	my	mind	the	conscious	awareness	of	the	choice,	as	well	as	the	content	of	the	
opAons.		To	be	aware	of	the	moral	import	of	the	choice	requires	that	I	consider	
whether	I	think	the	choice	to	be	a	good	or	bad	one,	and	why.		So	unlike	my	cat,	who	
	I	might	scold	the	cat	in	the	hope	that	this	will	deter	her	from	catching	mice	in	future.		This	is	however	15
a	behaviour	modiﬁcaAon	exercise,	rather	than	a	quesAon	of	just	desert.	It	is	also	not	in	my	experience	
very	successful.	
	This	is,	of	course,	not	an	uncontenAous	posiAon.		As	argued	by	Harry	Frankfurt	(1969	“AlternaAve	16
possibiliAes	and	moral	responsibility”,	Journal	of	Philosophy,	66(23):	829-39),	one	can	someAmes	be	
morally	responsible	for	an	acAon	even	though	one	could	not	have	done	otherwise,	if,	had	one	been	
free,	one	would	have	chosen	it	anyway.	
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presumably	sees	a	mouse,	thinks	“mouse	means	‘catch	it!’	”,	and	does	so	(whether	
hungry	or	not),	a	morally	accountable	cat	might	see	a	mouse,	and	then	think:		“I	have	
a	choice	whether	or	not	to	catch	this	mouse.		The	consequence	of	that	will	be	bad	for	
the	mouse,	and	neither	good	nor	bad	for	me,	since	I	am	not	hungry.		Since	the	overall	
consequence	is	negaAve,	catching	the	mouse	is	a	bad	choice.”		Therefore,	the	morally-
accountable	not-hungry	cat	will	not	catch	the	mouse.		Unfortunately	for	mice,	it	
seems	cats	are	not	capable	of	accessing	their	mental	states	in	this	way.			
Mental	states	of	which	we	are	aware	are,	according	to	Himma	(2009	p.27)	“conscious	
mental	states;	one	cannot	introspect	or	observe	what	is	not	available	to	
consciousness”.		On	this	reading	“consciousness”	is	“state	consciousness”,	as	opposed	
to	senAence,	wakefulness,	self-consciousness	or	transiAve	consciousness	(awareness	
of	other	things)	(Van	Gulick	2014	pp.7:9).		Speciﬁcally	this	state	consciousness	is	a	
state	one	is	aware	of	being	in	-	that	is,	a	mental	state	about	a	mental	state.		If	moral	
agency	requires	us	to	be	aware	of	our	acAons,	as	well	as	about	our	choices	about	our	
acAons,	then	Himma	(2009,	p.28)	concludes,	moral	agency	requires	(state)	
consciousness.			
Following	this	conclusion,	it	seems	evident	that	a	digital	agent	can	be	a	moral	agent	
only	if	it	is	conscious.		Although	ICTs	may	be	suﬃciently	sophisAcated	so	as	on	
occasion	to	appear	conscious,	there	is	as	yet	no	digital	agent	that	we	know	of	that	is	
to	our	knowledge	state	conscious	-	i.e.	aware	of	its	own	mental	state.		Even	if	we	
remain,	as	Himma	(2008	p.28)	is,	“agnosAc”	as	to	whether	that	is	possible ,			that	17
does	leave	us	currently	in	a	posiAon	where	it	doesn’t	seem	raAonal,	on	the	standard	
account,	to	hold	digital	agents	morally	accountable.	
If	digital	agents	are	not	moral	agents	-	not	morally	accountable	-		then	whom	are	we	
to	hold	accountable	for	the	morally	signiﬁcant	consequences	of	digital	agents’	
acAons?		Johnson	and	Miller	(2008,	p.131)	suggest	that	when	it	comes	to	quesAons	of	
responsibility	and	accountability	for	moral	consequences,	the	important	thing	is	keep	
	Dreyfus	(1972,	What	computers	can't	do:	A	cri6que	of	ar6ﬁcial	reason.,	New	York:	HarperCollins)	17
provides	a	compelling	phenomenological	argument	as	to	why	conscious	computers	are	in	fact		not	
possible.			However,	for	the	purpose	of	my	argument,	it	is	not	necessary	for	that	to	be	the	case.
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technology	“tethered”	to	the	designers	-	to	keep	holding	the	designers	accountable.	
However,	this	is	surely	not	pracAcal	or	even	possible	when	values	are	emergent.			If	
users	have	ﬂexibly	interpreted	a	design,	such	that	the	value	in	use	no	longer	reﬂects	
the	intenAons	of	the	designer,	it	may	not	make	sense	to	hold	the	designer	responsible	
for	that	use.		If	a	thief	interprets	the	design	of	an	ATM	to	enable	him	to	steal	from	a	
hapless	user,	is	the	ATM	designer	responsible?		Do	we	blame	the	vicAm	for	being	
careless?		Or	is	the	thief	accountable?		If	the	“thief”	is	in	fact	an	autonomous	digital	
agent,	and	not	morally	accountable	does	that	mean	no-thing	is	responsible	or	
accountable?		That	would	mean	that	there	is	no	possibility	of	applying	any	moral	
principles	to	some	digital	privacy	problems,	or	even	making	ad	hoc	moral	judgements	
about	them.		We	would,	in	many	cases,	simply	have	to	shrug	our	shoulders	and	admit	
that	digital	privacy	problems	are	beyond	moral	reasoning.	
If,	on	the	other	hand	and	as	I	have	argued	above,	it	makes	sense	to	consider,	at	the	
object-oriented	LoA,	the	emergent	values	of	both	digital	and	human	agents	–	the	
values	that	are	being	realized	through	acAon	–	then	it	might	make	sense	to	consider	
what	the	acAons	are	about	–	their	intenAonality?	
Inten6onality	
“Having	content,	being	about	something”	is	what	we	call	intenAonality	(Cole	2014).	
Since	digital	systems	certainly	have	content	we	might	ascribe	intenAonality	to	them.		
In	that	case	we	would	also	have	to	ascribe	intenAonality	to	works	of	art,	books,	
le*ers,		photographs	or	any	representaAonal	object	at	all.		In	most	standard	
deﬁniAons,	however,		intenAonality	is	assumed	to	be	a	mental	state	(Jacob,	2014),	and	
therefore	only	a	conscious	mind	is	capable	of	intenAonality.	PainAngs,	books,	le*ers	
and	photographs	do	not,	aler	all,	know	what	they	are	for.	One	of	the	most	famous	
arguments	for	the	necessity	of	self-consciousness	for	understanding,	intelligence	and	
intenAonality	is	John	Searle’s	Chinese	Room	Argument	(CRA),	best	summarized	by	
Searle	(1999)	himself:	
	Imagine	a	naAve	English	speaker	who	knows	no	Chinese	locked	in	
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a	room	full	of	boxes	of	Chinese	symbols	(a	data	base)	together	
with	a	book	of	instrucAons	for	manipulaAng	the	symbols	(the	
program).	Imagine	that	people	outside	the	room	send	in	other	
Chinese	symbols	which,	unknown	to	the	person	in	the	room,	are	
quesAons	in	Chinese	(the	input).	And	imagine	that	by	following	the	
instrucAons	in	the	program	the	man	in	the	room	is	able	to	pass	out	
Chinese	symbols	which	are	correct	answers	to	the	quesAons	(the	
output).	The	program	enables	the	person	in	the	room	to	pass	the	
Turing	Test	for	understanding	Chinese	but	he	does	not	understand	
a	word	of	Chinese.	(p.115)	
There	are	many	supporAng	discussions	and	rebu*als	of	the	CRA,	most	of	which	are	
directed	towards	cogniAve	science	and	the	possibility	of	arAﬁcial	intelligence.		What	is	
important	for	this	argument	is	the	quesAon	of	intenAonality,	and	whether	a	digital	
agent	can	ever	be	said	to	have	intenAonality.	
If	Searle	qua	the	man	in	the	Chinese	room	is	an	analogue	equivalent	of	a	digital	agent	
–	iniAaAng	outcomes	of	value/disvalue,	but	no	consciousness	or	understanding	of	the	
broader	context	–	can	he	be	said	to	have	intenAonality?		Originally,	in	the	1980	paper,	
Searle	used	the	argument	to	refute	the	possibility	of	computer	understanding	(Searle,	
1980).		Later	he	extended	the	implicaAon	to	refute	intenAonality	as	well,	wriAng	in	
2010	that	“…	the	implementaAon	of	the	computer	program	is	not	by	itself	suﬃcient	
for	consciousness	or	inten6onality”		(Searle	2010	p.17,	my	emphasis).		But	surely	the	
messages	have	content?				
As	Searle	(1980)	originally	points	out,	in	the	case	of	the	Chinese	room,	the	point	about	
the	Chinese	wriAng	is	precisely	that	it	has,	in	the	context	of	the	thought	experiment,	
no	content	whatsoever.		It	is	simply	a	formal	system	of	signs	–“Squibbles	and	
Squobbles”	-		with	no	meaning	at	all	for	the	person	locked	in	the	room.		“Because	the	
formal	symbol	manipulaAons	by	themselves	don't	have	any	intenAonality;	they	are	
quite	meaningless;	they	aren't	even	symbol	manipulaAons,	since	the	symbols	don't	
symbolize	anything.”	(p.11)		Searle	has	designed	the	thought	experiment	in	this	way,	
because	the	purpose	of	the	experiment	is	to	refute	the	possibility	of	understanding	on	
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the	part	of	computer	programmes,	which	themselves	don’t	understand	their	own	
symbols.			As	he	points	out	(p.13)	,	“…	if	you	type	into	the	computer	'2	plus	2	equals?’	
it	will	type	out	‘-4.'	But	it	has	no	idea	that	-4"	means	4	or	that	it	means	anything	at	
all.“	
Even	where	symbols	or	language	do	have	content,	this	content	or	intenAonality	is,	
according	to	Searle,	indirect	rather	than	original	or	intrinsic.	Language	of	any	kind	has	
content	only	insofar	as	it	is	interpreted	by	someone	who	necessarily	has	a	conscious	
mental	state,	“caused	by	and	realized	by	the	structure	in	the	brain”.	
Nonetheless,	the	whole	project	of	translaAng	Chinese	must	be	about	something.		
Arguably	we	could	suggest	that	the	enAre	Chinese	Room	thought	experiment	(rather	
than	the	person	inside	the	room,	or	even	the	whole	Room)	does	have	intenAonality,	
because	it	is	about	demonstraAng	the	impossibility	of	understanding	on	the	part	of	an	
individual	programme	or	algorithm	of	symbol	manipulaAon.		In	other	words	the	
construcAon	of	the	system	or	programme	as	a	whole	has	a	purpose,	a	reason	for	
being	in	the	ﬁrst	instance.			This	is	not	the	same	as	saying	"it	is	the	whole	room,	the	
whole	system	that	understands	Chinese,	not	the	man",	which	is,	as	Searle	(1999,	p.
115)	points	out,	one	of	the	standard	objecAons	to	the	thought	experiment.		Rather	I	
am	suggesAng	that	the	fact	that	the	Chinese	Room	experiment	has	a	parAcular	
outcome	(demonstraAng	that	the		"machine"	-	the	Room	-	doesn't	"think")		means	
that	there	is	content,	intent,	reason	to	be	(even	if	only	in	an	imaginary	state)	a*ached	
to	the	Chinese	Room	thought	experiment	as	a	whole.			Searle	would	presumably	rebut	
this	point	 	by	saying	that	it	is	he	Searle	(qua	designer	of	the	system)	who	has	18
intenAonality	and	not	the	system	itself.		
In	the	case	of	the	Chinese	Room,	which	is	a	very	simple	system,		it	does	indeed	seem	
logical	to	argue	that	the	intenAonality	is	enArely	Searle’s	intenAonality.			But	ICT	
systems	are	not	simply	input-process-output	systems	like	the	Chinese	Room.		Rather	
they	are	complex	socio-technical	systems.		As	I	have	argued	above,	we	can	seldom	
a*ribute	all	content	and	“aboutness”	in	a	fully	funcAoning	socio-technical	system	
	He	rebuts	the	idea	that	the	whole	room	understands	Chinese	in	Searle	(1999,	p.	115),	but	that	isn’t	18
the	point	I	am	making	here.		
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simply	to	the	intenAons	of	the	designer.		InterpreAve	ﬂexibility	means	that	these	
systems	as	a	whole	will	come	to	have	emergent	embedded	values	–	or	things	that	
they	are	about	and	for.		Can	we	not	therefore	ascribe	some	sort	of	intenAonality	to	
these	kinds	of	systems?	
According	to	Daniel	Denne*	(2009)	this	would	be	a	perfectly	legiAmate	thing	to	do.			
Denne*	suggests	that	we	are	jusAﬁed	in	adopAng	an	intenAonal	stance	towards	any	
complex	object	whose	behaviour	is	adequately	predicted	by	assuming	that	it	does	in	
fact	have	intenAonality.		According	to	Denne*	all	intenAonality	is	derived	as	far	as	we	
can	know	–	in	other	words	it	doesn’t	make	a	diﬀerence	whether	an	agent	has	direct	or	
indirect	intenAonality,	if	they	are	observed	to	act	with	what	appears	to	be	
intenAonality.		IntenAonal	systems	theory	“is	a	theory	about	how	and	why	we	are	able	
to	make	sense	of	the	behaviours	of	so	many	complicated	things	by	considering	them	
as	agents”	(Denne*	2009,	p.349).		
According	to	this	theory,	the	way	in	which	we	cope	in	the	world	is	to	assume	
intenAonality	on	the	part	of	many	complex	objects,	such	as	animals,	systems,	human	
beings,	cells,	eco-systems	and	so	on,	because	that	is	how	we	can,	for	the	most	part	
and	with	reasonable	or	good-enough	accuracy,	get	on	with	dealing	with	them.	We	
don’t	need	to	do	this	with	objects	that	have	staAc	content	(books,	works	of	art,	etc ),	19
but	as	soon	as	an	object	exhibits	behaviour,	this	is	how	we	manage	our	relaAonship	to	
and	dealings	with	it.		On	this	basis,	any	object	that	produces	(rather	than	merely	has)	
content	can	be	said	to	be	intenAonal.		The	object	doesn’t	require	a	mind,	let	alone	a	
conscious	one	in	order	for	us	to	infer	intenAonality.	
Would	it	then	be	valid	to	suggest	that	intenAonal	systems	theory	is	necessarily	at	the	
same	LoA	as	an	object-oriented	theory	of	the	nature	I’m	suggesAng?		In	fact	it	is	not.		
Denne*	is	quite	commi*ed	to	all	intenAonality	being	derived	as	far	as	we	know,	at	
any	given	LoA.		Speciﬁcally	he	claims	that	
“(1)	there	is	no	principled	(theoreAcally	moAvated)	way	to	
disAnguish	‘original’	intenAonality	from	‘derived’	intenAonality,	
	Although	of	course	any	criAcal	engagement	with	a	work	of	art	or	book	will	have	to	ask	what	it	is	19
about,	rather	than	simply	what	it	contains.		
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and	
(2)	there	is	a	conAnuum	of	cases	of	legiAmate	a*ribuAons,	with	no	
theoreAcally	moAvated	threshold	disAnguishing	the	‘literal’	from	
the	‘metaphorical’	or	merely	‘as	if’	cases.”		(2009,	p.342)	
Of	course,		like	the	Chinese	Room,	the	percepAon	of		intenAonality,	whether	derived	
or	original,	requires	an	agent	that	is	itself	capable	of	making	sense	of	the	behaviour	as	
inten6onal	in	the	ﬁrst	instance	-	that	is,	that	agent	must	have	original	intenAonality	
itself.		A	world	in	which	there	was	only	derived	intenAonality	would	in	fact	be	a	world	
without	intenAonality:		A	world	full	of	Chinese	Rooms	-	with	no	John	Searle	or	any	one	
else	to	argue	with	him	or	each	other	about	meaning	-	would	be	quite	meaningless.			
As	a	further	example,	if	humanity	were	enArely	wiped	out,	but	computers	survived,	
some	of	these	computers	might	be	chess	computers	set	up	to	play	chess	at	the	
moment	of	Armageddon.	They	would	then	conAnue	to	play	matches	against	each	
other	into	inﬁnity	(or	for	at	least	as	long	as	the	electricity	supply	lasted).		In	such	a	
world,	is	anyone	sAll	‘playing	chess’?	As	per	the	Chinese	Room	Argument,	a	chess	
playing	computer	isn’t	really	playing	chess,	it	is	execuAng	a	parAcular	program,	that’s	
all. 	The	same	applies	for	a	world	full	of	‘derived	intenAonality’.		It	arguably	applies	20
today,	at	the	purely	technical	level	of	Gmail	screening	my	emails,	or	Facebook	storing	
pages	of	Max	Schrem’s	data	that	may	never	be	used.		
This	is	a	very	strong	argument,	in	my	view,	for	intenAonal	systems	theory	not	
necessarily	being	applicable	at	all	levels	of	acAvity	-	in	other	words,	it	is,	per	the	
argument	above,	diﬃcult	to	a*ribute	any	intenAonality	at	all,	if	the	a*ribuAon	is	not	
itself	being	made	by	an	agent	that	itself	has	some	degree	of	original	intenAonality.		
However,	for	the	speciﬁc	purpose	of	developing	an	object-oriented	privacy	ethics,	if	
we	can	adopt	a	view	(a	Level	of	AbstracAon)	at	which	we	deal	with	and	manage	our	
relaAonships	to	other	agents		(both	human	and	digital)	by	assuming	intenAonality	on	
their	part,	and	such	a	Level	of	AbstracAon	enables	us	to	make	sense	of	the	content	
and	value	of	their	acAons,	then	we	may	ﬁnd	it	useful	to	do	this.	
	My	thanks	to	Dr	Kowalenko	for	this	counter	argument	and	example.20
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This	raises	the	quesAon	of	exactly	what	is	meant	by	a	“Level	of	AbstracAon”,	and	what	
the		object-oriented	Level	of	AbstracAon	that	I	am	proposing	would	entail.	
	 An	Object-oriented	Level	of	Abstrac6on.	
In	the	discussion	above	I	have	argued	that	IE	does	not	provide	a	coherent	theoreAcal	
basis	(a	macroethics)	for	considering	problems	of	digital	privacy.		Where	I	do	think	IE	is	
useful	is	in	that	Floridi	introduces	the	concept	of	a	Level	of	AbstracAon	(LoA)	as	a	
conceptual	device	which	can	be	applied	to	moral	problems,	and	in	parAcular	moral	
problems	involving	digital	agents.			
Floridi	iniAally	(1999)	suggests	that	IE	is	a	‘perspecAve”	(p.49)	or	a	way	of	seeing	the	
world.		In	this	perspecAve,	everything	is	to	be	viewed	at	the	level	of	its	informaAon		-	
“An	enAty	is	a	consistent	pack	of	informaAon…and	can	be	named	or	denoted	in	an	
informaAon	process….IE	treats	every	logically	possible	enAty	as	an	informaAon	enAty”	
(p.44).		An	agent	is	then	any	enAty	that	can	“aﬀect	the	infosphere”	-	even	by	means	of	
its	existence.			From	this	perspecAve,	moral	judgements	are	made	in	terms	of	how	
enAAes	aﬀect	the	infosphere		-	and	it	is	this	which	makes	IE	“object-oriented”	(p.	49)-	
it	has	all	objects	in	view,	both	agents	and	paAents,	of	all	kinds,	thus	“enlarging	the	
ethical	discourse”	(p.50).	
In	later	wriAngs	Floridi	(2002,	2008c)	formalises	this	noAon	of	a	“perspecAve”	to	that	
of	a	LoA,	a	concept	which	he	imports	from	computer	science,	where	it	is	used	to	
model	informaAonal	systems.		A	level	of	abstracAon	is	exactly	that	-	a	parAcular	level	
at	which	we	abstract	certain	details	for	the	purposes	of	represenAng	reality.		So	in	a	
computer	system	a	real-life	studying	breathing	exisAng	human	being	may	be	
represented,	for	example,	by	a	student	number,	with	which	a	parAcular	set	of	courses,	
course	marks,	results	and	an	outcome	would	be	associated.	Floridi	(2002)	points	out	
that	a	LoA	provides	a	“set	of	observables	available	at	that	level”		-	“the	higher	the	LoA,	
the	more	impoverished	is	the	set	of	observables,	and	the	more	extended	is	the	scope	
of	the	analysis”	(p.288).	
		
Given	that	we	always	have	a	parAcular	perspecAve	when	considering	a		phenomenon	
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or	set	of	phenomena,	or	a	moral	problem	for	that	ma*er,	we	can	be	said	to	have	
always	adopted	some	or	other	level	of	abstracAon.		In	other	words	a	LoA	is	“implicit”	-	
the	“hidden	parameter“	or	“context”	that	“allows	for	a	proper	deﬁniAon”		-	“whether	
it	be	in	the	realm	of	Euclidean	geometry,	quantum	physics	or	commonsensical	
percepAon”	(Floridi	and	Sanders,	2004,	p.353).			For	Floridi	(and	computer	and	other	
scienAsts	in	general)	any	situaAon	is	also		“a	collecAon	of	observables,	each	which	has	
a	well-deﬁned	possible	set	of	values	or	outcomes”	(p.354).		This	leads	him	to	conclude	
that	the	Method	of	AbstracAon	consists	of	formalising	the	model	through	the	analysis	
of	the	system	(p.355),	and	that	therefore	the	concept	of	the	LoA	is	an	“epistemological	
levelism”	(2008c,	p.304).		In	other	words,	the	concept	of	a	Level	of	AbstracAon	is	a	
device	for	understanding	what	is	going	on,	in	a	parAcular	situaAon,	with	a	parAcular	
epistemological	purpose	in	mind.		In	order	to	make	sense	of	-		or	make	an	analysis	of	
or	moral	judgements	about	-		a	situaAon,	we	have	to	abstract	the	relevant	features	of	
the	situaAon	and	focus	on	those.		A	Level	of	AbstracAon	simply	denotes	the	boundary	
of	the	situaAon	and	the	granularity	with	which	we	carve	out	these	features,	and	
therefore	what	counts	in	the	analysis.					
Lucas	(2012)	points	out	that,	because	systems	are	constructed	(rather	than	naturally	
occurring),	their	boundaries	are	too,	and	there	may	therefore	be	no	‘natural’	LoA	at	
which	we	can	naturally	accept	that	systems	are	moral	agents	(p.49).		In	fact,	“the	idea	
of	mulAple	(and	related	in	some	strong	sense)	LoAs	also	leads	us	to	ask	whether	some	
diﬀerent	LoAs	might	simply	be	a	case	of	Wi*genstein’s	seeing	as”	(p.50).	
Lucas	makes	this	criAque	of	Floridi	to	argue	against	an	LoA	as	a	“natural	
characterisaAon	of	morality”	(Lucas,	2012,	p.63).		However,	for	my	purposes,	“seeing	
as”	is	precisely	what	I	am	aiming	at	-	an	epistemological	level	or	LoA	at	which	we	see	
human	and	non-human	agents	as	intenAonal	moral	agents,	because	this	is	a	level	at	
which	we	are	able	to	make	sense	of	the	moral	import	of	their	interacAon.	This	is	aler	
all	the	purpose	of	abstracAon:	When	I	equate	a	dot	on	a	map	to	a	city,	it	is	not	that	I	
expect	that	the	dot	corresponds	in	any	real	way	to	the	city	-	the	city	is	not	a	big	dot,	it	
is	not	dot-shaped,	it	is	not	a	solid	enAty,	is	not	actually	ﬁxed,	it	is	mutable	and	
developing.		Nonetheless	for	the	purpose	of	orienAng	my	travel	towards	the	city,	the	
dot	on	the	map	is	a	truthful	representaAon	that	allows	me	to	make	sense	of	my	
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direcAon.		Similarly,	an	epistemological	LoA,	at	which	all	agents	are	seen	as	
intenAonal,	can	assist	us	in	making	moral	judgements	about	what	those	agents,	in	any	
given	situaAon,	ought	to	do.	
What	I	am	not	arguing	for	is	IE	itself	-	an	infocentric	LoA	at	which	everything	is	
conceived	of	as	its	informaAon	-	because	as	shown	earlier	that	doesn’t	help	us	with	
privacy	issues.		What	I	am	suggesAng	is	a	LoA	that	is		
- not	anthropocentric	(like	deontology	or	consequenAalism)	or	bio-centric	(like	
environmental	ethics)		but	being-	or	onto-centric	-	giving	moral	import	to	the	
agency	of	human	and	non-human	agents	alike.	
- neither	agent	oriented	nor	paAent	oriented,	but	object	oriented	-	not	only	
concerned	with	agents	(those	acAng)	or	paAents	(those	being	acted	upon),	but	with	
the	intersecAon	of	both.	
- “not	an	ethics	of	virtue,	happiness	or	duty,	but	of	respect	and	care”	(Floridi,	1999,	
p.49).		Since	I	am	not	arguing	for	personhood	or	consciousness	for	digital	agents	I	
cannot	frame	ethics	in	terms	of	virtue,	happiness	or	duty.		However,	if	i	am	
concerned	with	all	agents	and	paAents	in	the	situaAon	I	can	suggest	that	we	should	
respect	and	care	for	them.		
To	precisely	deﬁne	the	LoA:	I	am	suggesAng	that	in	situaAons	of	digital	privacy	
concerns,	we	see	that	human	and	non-human	(arAﬁcial)	agents	are	equally	objects	
producing	outcomes	of	value	/	disvalue	and	as	such	they	are	considered	to	have	
intenAonality.		Because	human	and	non-human	agents	take	acAons	that	have	moral	
import,	they	must	for	purposes	of	making	sense	of	the	world	be	considered	to	have	
moral	agency.		That	is,		we	can	legiAmately	worry	about	and		judge	the	moral	import	
of	their	acAons	and	declare	some	right	and	others	wrong.		The	moral	imperaAve	is	to	
balance	respect	and	care	for	both	human	and	non-human	agents.			
This	LoA	is	of	course	pragmaAc,	rather	than	essenAalist.		I	am	not	suggesAng	that	non-
human	agents	necessarily	and	always	are	intenAonal	moral	agents.		I	am	following	
Denne*	(2009)	in	a*ribuAng	intenAonality	to	all	agents,	but	only	as	far	as	the	LoA	
requires,	and	in	fact	not	as	far	as	Denne*	would	go,	because	I	think	the	counter-
argument	for	requiring	conscious	intenAonality	at	some	level	is	very	strong.		So	I	am	
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not	suggesAng	that	this	LoA	is	essenAally	and	always	the	only	correct	or	relevant	LoA,	
but	rather	that	it	can	be	useful	to	apply	it	in	situa6ons	of	digital	privacy	concern,	
because	this	LoA	is	the	workable	one,	at	which	we	can	in	fact	even	begin	to	make	
sense	of	these	concerns.			
This	LoA	is	usefully	applied	because	at	the	moment	we	assume	very	li*le	moral	
import	a*aching	to	non-human	acAon,	and	therefore	we	possibly	neglect	care	and	
respect	for	human	agents	and/or	paAents	in	the	system.			
What	follows	further,	is	that	at	this	level	human	and	non-human	agents	legiAmately	
have	compeAng	interests.		This	raises	the	quesAon	of	whether	there	is	a	hierarchy	of	
priority	of	those	interests,	or	at	least	a	principled	way	to	balance	them.	Given	that	my	
intenAon	here	is	to	consider,	in	parAcular,	the	privacy	problems	posed	by	digital	ICT,	it	
is	inadequate	simply	to	say	that	human	and	arAﬁcial	agents	are	both	agents	and	
paAents	in	privacy-related	moral	acAon,	whose	compeAng	rights	and	interests	need	to	
be	balanced.		If	we	consider	the	pracAcal	case	of	Max	Schrems	and	Facebook,	it	is	not	
adequate	to	say	that	both	have	interests	in	the	case	-	although	it	is	easy	enough	to	
idenAfy	them	-	Max	Schrems	wants	privacy	and	his	data	to	be	deleted,	and	Facebook	
wants	to	keep	it	(and	all	the	other	data	of	the	billions	of	people	on	Facebook,	which	is	
the	point	of	the	legal	case	of	course).			We	have	to	ask	what	intrinsic	values	underpin	
those	interests,	and	how	we	can	sensibly	consider	them.			We	need	to	consider	on	
what	basis	we	can	evaluate	and	balance	interests	in	respect	of	digital	privacy	in	order	
to	apply	the	object-oriented	LoA	to	digital	privacy	problems.	
Applying	an	object-oriented	LoA	to	digital	privacy	problems		
As	discussed	earlier	in	this	essay,	it	is	precisely	the	diﬃculAes	of	“privacy	in	public”	
caused	by	the	use	of	ICT	to	reveal	idenAty	in	very	profound	ways	(Nissembaum,	1997,	
1998)		that	we	need	to	deal	with.		If	it	is	in	the	interests	of	the	non-human	agent	to	
whom	I	have	freely	given	my	data	that	it	is	used,	then	what	right	do	I	have	to	preclude	
its	use?		If	Max	Schrems	chooses	to	share	his	informaAon	with	the	world	using	
Facebook,	for	free,	then	why	shouldn’t	Facebook	itself	store,	mine	and	sell	that	
informaAon?		Isn’t	that	a	fair	exchange?		What	informaAon	is	private	and	what	is	
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simply	public	anyway?	
If	moral	constraints	about	the	use	of	personal	data	exist	only	to	prevent	against	
intrusion	into	the	private	realm,	whether	by	governments,	corporaAons	or	other	
individuals	(Nissembaum,	2004),	then	data	that	is	already	in	the	public	realm	-	
whether	by	virtue	of	its	locaAon	or	its	nature	-	cannot	be	said	to	be	protectable	in	the	
ﬁrst	place.	This	is,	however,	at	odds	with	both	our	intuiAons	and	the	demonstrable	
potenAal	for	intrusion	inherent	in	the	use	of	publicly-available	data	by	powerful	ICTs.			
As	noted	by	Nissembaum	(1997,	1998,	2004),	Schonscheck	(1997)	and	Van	Den	Hoven		
(1997),	the	reason	that	privacy	in	public	places	is	not	well	accounted	for	by	tradiAonal	
theories	is	that	these	theories	assume	a	dichotomy	between	the	public	and	the	
private.		This	is	an	over-simpliﬁcaAon	of	the	complexiAes	of	what	data	(with	respect	to	
both	type	and	locaAon)	can	be	considered	to	be	private.		Following	Schoeman	(1984,	
cited	in	Nissembaum,	2004),	these	authors	variously	note	that	there	are	in	fact	
mulAple	private	realms	or	spheres.		Privacy	is	therefore	something	that	pertains	
within	a	parAcular	sphere	with	respect	to	norms	of	appropriateness	(Nissembaum,	
2004,	p.138)	and	distribuAon	(Nissembaum	2004,	p.140).	
Appropriateness	is	a	norm	that	dictates	what	kind	of	informaAon	it	is	appropriate	to	
reveal	in	a	parAcular	context	or	sphere.	The	relevant	criteria	for	judging	whether	a	
piece	of	data	or	informaAon	should	be	shared	is	thus	associaAonal	relevance,	rather	
than	whether	the	informaAon	itself	is	public	or	private,	or	of	a	sensiAve	nature.		
Familiar	examples	include	the	extent	to	which	I	would	share	medical	informaAon	with	
my	doctor,	or	ﬁnancial	informaAon	with	my	bank.	
Once	we	perceive	that	the	desired	privacy	of	parAcular	kinds	of	data	is	relaAve	to	
parAcular	contexts	or	spheres,	then	it	becomes	evident	that	privacy	concerns	-	and	
parAcularly	concerns	of	privacy	in	public	-	are	raised	by	the	distribuAon	of	data	within	
and	even	more	so	between	spheres.		In	fact,	in	many	cases,	we	would	not	want	data	
to	be	shared	between	spheres	at	all	-	we	don’t	want	our	medical	records	given	to	our	
bank	or	our	ﬁnancial	informaAon	to	our	doctor.		Publicly-available	data	that	is	mined	
to	provide	a	rich	“mosaic”	(Schonsheck,	1997,	p.225)	of	our	pa*erns	of	behaviour	-	
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and	then	sold	to	corporaAons	that	may	be	well	outside	the	sphere	in	which	the	data	
was	originally	collected	or	provided	-	is	very	likely	to	be	data	that	has	not	only	crossed	
mulAple	spheres,	but	has	changed	in	its	associaAonal	relevance	along	the	way.			
Both	Nissenbaum	(1997,1998,	2004)	and	Van	Den	Hoven	(1997,	1999)	follow	Michael	
Walzer’s	(1983)	idea	of	spheres	of	social	jusAce,	within	which	parAcular	norms	of	
distribuAon	apply,	and	which	should	be	impermeable.		Walzer	has	in	mind	social	
goods	such	as	power	or	money,	which	may	legiAmately	be	distributed	in	parAcular	
ways	within	a	sphere	(money	in	the	commercial	sphere,	power	in	the	poliAcal	sphere)	
but	which	should	not	have	inﬂuence	across	spheres.		So	money	should	not	be	able	to	
buy	poliAcal	inﬂuence,	for	example.		Nissenbaum	and	Van	Den	Hoven	(separately)		
suggest	that	informaAon	is	equally	a	good	that,	given	parAcular	norms	of	associaAon,	
should	not	be	distributed	across	discrete	spheres.	As	Van	Den	Hoven	puts	it	“what	is	
olen	seen	as	a	violaAon	of	privacy	has	more	to	do	with	informaAon	traﬃc	across	the	
boundaries	of	what	we	intuiAvely	think	of	a	separate	social	spheres”	(1999,	p.144) .		21
This	concept	is	useful	for	understanding	why	it	is	that	we	intuiAvely	feel	that	privacy	
has	been	breached	when	informaAon	is	disclosed	in	unexpected	ways	or	places.	It	
does	however	have	its	limitaAons,	if	it	is	bound	to	social	norms	(Nissenbaum	2004,	p.
144)	of	what	informaAon	pertains	to	which	spheres,	rather	than	moral	rules	per	se.			
We	therefore	need	to	try	and	idenAfy	how	norms	of	distribuAon	can	be	established	
that	are	not	simply	pracAce	or	convenAon,	but	rather	Aed	to	some	intrinsic	rights	or	
values.		In	other	words,	we	can	suggest	that	data	should	be	distributable,	or	not,	
between	spheres	based	on	an	evaluaAon	of	the	eﬀect	that	the	distribuAon	would	
have	on	the	intrinsic	values	of	equality,	freedom,	autonomy	or	safety,	with	a	view	to	
balancing	those	across	agent	and	paAent,	as	well	as	digital	and	human	agents	and	
paAents,	in	order	to	promote	their	respect	and	care.		
	Nagenborg,	M.	(2009)	Designing	spheres	of	informaAonal	jusAce,	Ethics	and	informa6on	technology,	21
11(3),	pp.175-179		criAques	Van	Den	Hoven’s	and	Nissenbaum’s	use	of	the	concept	of	spheres,	on	the	
grounds	that	if	there	is	a	“sphere	of	informaAon”	then	sharing,	for	example,	medical		informaAon	from	
the	economic	sphere	would	not	be	an	injusAce,	as	the	“informaAon	accessed	sAlls	remains	within	the	
sphere	of	informaAon”.		This	seems	to	be	a	misreading	of	both	Van	Den	Hoven	and	Nissenbaum,	
neither	of	whom	suggest	a	sphere	of	informaAon	at	all,	but	rather	that	informaAon	is	one	of	those	
goods	(like	money,	power	or	educaAon)	that	should	be	appropriately	distributed	within	and	not	
between	spheres.	
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How	can	I	jusAfy	equality,	freedom,	autonomy	or	safety	as	intrinsic	values?		A	
discussion	of	intrinsic	versus	extrinsic	value	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	essay,	except	
to	say	that	“That	which	is	intrinsically	good	is	nonderivaAvely	good;	it	is	good	for	its	
own	sake.”	(Zimmerman,	2015	p.6).			This	parAcular	list	of	intrinsic	values	is	derived	
from	Nissembaum’s		(1998)	discussion	of	the	‘genuine	privacy	interest’	that	follows	
from	the	need	to	protect	these	individual	and	social	values.	(pp.	591:593),	and	also	
from	the	fact	that	-	with	the	excepAon	of	equality	-	they	correspond	to	each	of	the	
types	of	privacy,	that	is,	freedom	to	decisional	privacy,	autonomy	to	mental	privacy	
and	safety	to	physical	privacy.	
What	I	am	arguing	for,	therefore,	is	that	there	are	in	fact	intrinsic	values,	and	that	
these	are	the	meta-ethical	basis 	on	which	the	object-oriented	approach	to	digital	22
privacy	problems	rests.		This	is	of	course,	slightly	problemaAc	in	the	absence	of	the	
autonomous	agent,	because	rights	are	normally	seen	as	the	consequence	of	a	
deontological	anthropocentric	approach.		So	how	do	I	account	for	them?		It	seems	to	
me	that	a	process	of	reﬂecAve	equilibrium	allows	for	this:		IntuiAvely	we	understand	
that	there	is	something	that	needs	to	be	protected	in	digital	privacy	situaAons,	and	
that	we	need	to	proceed	with	cauAon	in	ensuring	this	protecAon.		Since	neither	purely	
consequenAal,	nor	ownership-based	approaches	help	us	to	do	this,	we	need	an	
alternaAve	explanaAon	for	our	moral	intuiAon	in	this	domain.		The	best	explanaAon	
may	well	be	that	there	are	rights	and	values	at	risk,	and	that	these	potenAally	a*ach	
to	all	agents	in	the	situaAon.		
This	is	why	it	has	been	important	to	establish	the	object-oriented	LoA	-	because	we	
need	to	be	able	to	a*ach	rights	and	values	to	digital	agents	as	well	as	human	ones,	if	
we	are	to	determine	normaAve	guidelines	for	the	distribuAon	of	informaAon	within	
and	between	spheres.	
	This	is	a	further	disAncAon	between	IE	and	the	applied	object-oriented	approach	that	I	am	22
a*empAng	to	develop	here.		IE	is	a	meta-ethics,	in	terms	of	which	the	basic	principle	of	good	is	
existence	of	informaAon,	and	the	basic	principle	of	evil	is	entropy.		I	am	not	a*empAng	to	develop	a	
meta-ethics,	but	rather	an	applied	approach	to	a	parAcular	domain,	which	rests	on	the	concept	of	
intrinsic	rights	as	a	metaphysical	foundaAon	to	ground	moral	judgements.		To	the	extent	that	‘rights	and	
values’	can	be	seen	to	be	pluralist,	this	approach	would	be	equally	so.	
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Just	as	it	is	not	useful	to	draw	a	simple	disAncAon	between	public	and	private	
informaAon,	it	is	not	useful	to	draw	a	simple	the	disAncAon	between	the	online	and	
real	worlds	because	data,	and	the	value	accruing	to	data,		does	leak	across	these	as	a	
quesAon	of	fact.		This	is	why	object-oriented	view	is	useful,	because	it	ﬂa*ens	“digital”	
versus	“real”	disAncAons.		For	example,	on	the	object-oriented	view,	Google	scanning	
my	email	is	exactly	the	same	as	someone	reading	it.		That	accounts	for	quesAons	that	
may	be	raised	about	privacy	implicaAons	of	Google	scanning	my	email.		The	quesAon	
then	to	ask	is	–	in	what	sphere	is	my	email	and	what	norms	should	apply?		
This	raises	a	diﬃculty,	because	given	the	communicaAve	and	broad-reaching	nature	of	
most	digital	ICTs,	it	is	someAmes	hard	to	determine	exactly	what	sphere	a	parAcular	
piece	of	informaAon	actually	belongs	to.	A	useful	way	to	draw	the	disAncAons	may	be	
to	draw	on	the	intenAonality	of	the	agent	and	paAent	in	a	parAcular	sphere	-	in	other	
words	to	ask,	what	is	this	informaAon	used	for,	in	this	sphere?		A	non-digital	example	
would	be	my	communicaAon	with	my	doctor	-	I	am	using	medical	informaAon	to	
inform	my	doctor	so	that	she	can	medically	assist	me,	and	she	is	using	it	for	the	same	
purpose,	and	perhaps	also	to	inform	her	own	pracAce	and	experience,	maybe	even	to	
write	it	up	in	a	case	study	in	a	journal.	The	extent	to	which	the	informaAon	can	be	
shared,	and	what	informaAon	is	shared,		will	require	it	to	be	used	for	only	those	
purposes,	and	in	a	way	that	does	not	infringe	on	my	freedom,	autonomy,	security	or	
equality.		So	my	doctor	can	share	my	details,	including	my	idenAty,	with	a	specialist	
who	will	further	assist	me;	but	will	make	sure	I	am	anonymous	if	she	writes	up	the	
case	in	a	journal.		
In	the	digital	realm	we	could	consider	the	example	of	free-to-use	email,	such	as	Gmail.		
In	that	case	I	could	say	that	email	is	used	for	communicaAon	by	me,	but	for	revenue	
generaAon	for	Google.		On	such	a	consideraAon,	my	communicaAon	is	legiAmately	
distributable	within	the	sphere	of	revenue	generaAng	acAvity		for	Google.				This	does	
correspond	to	the	pracAce	of	how	the	sphere	works	in	fact	-	right	now	Google	does	
draw	the	boundaries	to	include	revenue	generaAon.		For	example,	if	I	send	emails	
with	the	subject	heading	“text	books”	on	Gmail,	I	might	shortly	receive	an	email	from	
an	online	store	oﬀering	me	a	discount	on	text	books.		Clearly	Google	has	sold	the	data	
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that	I	am	interested	in	text	books	to	the	online	store.		The	intrinsic	value	being	
protected	is	Google’s	freedom	to	operate	proﬁtably.			At	risk	are	my	autonomy	to	buy	
books	without	being	intruded	upon	and	my	equality	since	my	relaAonship	with	Google	
is	a	highly	unequal	one,	in	which	they	did	not	consider	it	necessary	to	ask	if	they	could	
sell	this	piece	of	informaAon.	
In	fact,	this	has	implicaAons	for	who	gets	to	draw	the	boundaries	of	the	sphere.		Olen	
it	is	not	explicit	to	the	user	where	the	boundaries	are,	unless	they	are	paying	very	
careful	a*enAon.	Perhaps	an	important	principle	is	that	the	boundaries	need	to	be	
explicitly	negoAated	between	the	agents	–	I	get	to	say	what	I	intend	to	use	my	email	
for	and	what	I	expect	the	norms	to	be,	Google	gets	to	say	what	it	intends	to	use	it	for	
–	and	if	we	don’t	agree	on	that,	then	we	don’t	enter	the	sphere	at	all.		
On	balance	since	the	digital-objects	are	generally	much	more	powerful	than	the	
human	ones	(given	data	volume	and	processing	capacity),	this	must	mean	far	more	
disclosure	and	negoAaAng	power	should	be	given	to	the	human	objects	than	is	
currently	the	case.		To	put	it	simply,	instead	of	burying	privacy	policies	on	pages	that	
need	to	be	speciﬁcally	accessed,	and	couching	them	in	lengthy	and	someAme	
legalisAc	terms,	organisaAons	need	to	be	really	explicit,	in	simple	lay-persons	terms,	
about	what	they	are	going	to	do	with	my	data.		Ideally	they	should	point	out	every	
Ame	they	are	using	my	data.		Equally,	I	need	to	accept	that	Google	does	have	some	
claim,	in	terms	of	the	sphere	in	which	we	co-operate,	to	make	use	of	that	data.	
Therefore,	I	suggest	that	in	order	to	make	sense	of	digital	privacy	problems	we	need	
to	apply	the	following	principles:	
1. All	agents	and	paAents	in	the	system	need	to	be	taken	into	account	
2. The	contextual	sphere	within	which	the	informaAon	concerned	is	shared	needs	to	
be	deﬁned.		This	can	be	done	by	determining	what	the	purpose	of	the	
informaAonal	sharing	is,	in	the	parAcular	sphere.	
3. Movement	of	informaAon	within	and	parAcularly	beyond	the	boundary	of	that	
sphere	is	only	permissible	if	it	does	not	compromise	the	freedom,	autonomy,	
security	or	equality	of	either	agent	or	paAent.	
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Would	an	applicaAon	of	these	principles	enable	us	to	consistently	and	sensibly		
assess	our	moral	intuiAons	about	what	is	morally	permissible	and	impermissible	when	
it	comes	to	breaches	of	our	privacy	online?		In	other	words,	are	the	problems	that	
occur	with	purely	deontological	and	consequenAalist		approaches	avoided	with	an	
object-oriented	ethics	of	this	kind?	
Certainly	any	conceptual	limitaAon	on	applying	moral	norms	to	non-human	and	even	
non-corporeal	(digital)	agents	is	overcome	by	moving	to	the	level	of	object	orientaAon	
I	am	proposing.	The	quesAons	to	ask	are	whether	this	is	intellectually		defensible,	and	
whether	it	is	useful.	
If	moving	to	an	object-oriented	LoA	as	I	have	described	it	were	simply	a	mental	act	of	
imaginaAon	or	ﬁcAon	then	it	would	not	be	intellectually	defensible.		It	would	be	as	if	I	
said,	“imagine	there	are	bad	fairies	in	the	world”	and	suggested	that	we	should	adjust	
our	behaviour	accordingly.	Perhaps	we	would	then	avoid	ever	touching	a	needle,	but	
this	would	be	simply	supersAAon.	As	I	have	demonstrated	however,	digital	systems	do	
have	emergent	values	that	are	independent	of	their	designers,	and	which	we	need	to	
take	into	account.		So	conceptually	viewing	systems	as	having	moral	intenAonality	is	
not	just	a	ﬁcAon	but	rather	a	parAcular	view	or	abstracAon.			It	is	a	legiAmate	way	of	
knowing	about	these	systems	and	our	interacAons	with	them	that	is	not	in	the	realm	
of	the	merely	ﬁcAonal.		
The	quesAon	remains	as	to	whether	the	approach	is	useful.		If	we	apply	it	to	a	
parAcular	case	we	may	be	able	to	see	whether	it	helps.		Let	us	take	the	case	of	Max	
Schrems	and	the	thousands	of	pages	of	his	data	that	Facebook	stored	without	his	
knowledge.		Applying	the	principles	I	have	listed	above:	
1. Both	Schrems	and	the	Facebook	system	are	valid	objects	of	consideraAon	in	this	
case;	
2. The	contextual	sphere	is	one	in	which	Schrems	voluntarily	shared	informaAon	
about	himself,	and	presumably	his	personal	life,	with	anyone	who	had	access	to	
his	Facebook	page,	and	therefore	with	Facebook	itself.		For	Schrems	the	purpose	
of	this	sphere	is	to	share	informaAon,	for	a	limited	period	of	Ame	(since	he	deleted	
it),	with	his	friends.		For	Facebook	the	purpose	of	collecAng	Schrems	informaAon	
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in	the	ﬁrst	place,	and	then	storing	it,		is	to	be	able	to	run	a	proﬁtable	organisaAon	
with	this	kind	of	data.	
3. The	movement	of	data	up	to	now	appears	to	be	within	the	sphere.		Schrems	
‘deleted’	it,	which	in	pracAce	meant	that	Facebook	‘moved’	it	from	being	
accessible	to	Schrems	and	his	friends,	to	being	stored	-	or	accessible	to	Facebook	
only	(we	can	for	the	purposes	of	this	case	assume	they	didn’t	sell	it	as	such).		Did	
this	movement	of	data	compromise	the	freedom,	autonomy,	security	or	equality	
of	either	Facebook	or	Schrems?		Arguably	this	movement,	while	promoAng	
Facebook’s	freedom	(to	do	with	the	data	as	it	saw	ﬁt)	and	security	(as	a	viable	
commercial	concern),	compromised	Schrems'	autonomy	(his	knowledge	of	and	
ability	to	change	something	that	relates	very	closely	to	him)	and	equality	(knowing	
as	well	as	Facebook	does	what	is	going	on),	precisely	because	he	did	not	iniAally	
know	that	Facebook	either	would	or	had	stored	this	data.	
I	would	suggest	that	the	object-oriented	approach	is	useful,	because	it	shows	up	some	
important	aspects	of	the	case.		Firstly	it	highlights	that	Facebook	does	have	some	
interest	that	needs	to	be	taken	into	account,	and	it	is	not	adequate	simply	to	cast	it	as	
the	Big	Bad	Wolf	in	the	story.		Secondly,	it	explains	why	someone	like	Schrems	intuits	
that	what	Facebook	has	done	is	not	acceptable	-	it	is	because	Facebook	kept	his	data,	
secretly,	without	telling	him	what	it	was	doing.		In	this	way	his	autonomy	and	his	
equality	were	both	compromised.		Since	Facebook’s	acAon	in	keeping	the	data	
compromised	these	rights,	it	is	morally	impermissible.		Were	Facebook	to	be	
completely	transparent	with	all	users	about	what	it	does	with	‘deleted’	data	-	and	the	
users	consented	by	using	Facebook	anyway,	it	would	be	morally	permissible.		
Conclusion	
I	can,	therefore,	conclude	that	the	object-oriented	LoA	that	I	am	proposing	can	be	
adopted	for	speciﬁc	cases		-	that	is,	for	digital	privacy	problems.		In	such	cases,	and	for	
the	speciﬁc	purpose	of	weighing	up	the	compeAng	rights	and	values	of	all	the	agents	
and	paAents	in	the	case,	we	can	treat	all	agents	(human	and	non-human)	as	both	
intenAonal	and	real.		This	provides	a	reading	of	the	case	that	goes	beyond	the	
consequenAalist	or	ownership-based	approaches,	and	arguably	gets	closer	to	the	
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heart	of	the	issue.	
Where	the	approach	is	sAll	open,	however,	is	that	we	sAll	somehow	have	to	jusAfy	and	
balance	these	interests.		We	have	to	ﬁnd	a	way	to	respect	and	care	for	both	digital	and	
non-digital	agents	and	paAents.		So	while	I	have	proposed	some	principles	for	
balancing	interests,	based	on	the	concept	of	context	spheres,		there	are	sAll	issues	
remaining	in	how	we	approach	digital	privacy	problems.			
The	ﬁrst	issue	is	to	jusAfy	more	carefully	the	selecAon	of	rights	and	values	that	I	have	
chosen	to	specify	as	intrinsic.		I	have	a*empted	a	parsimonious	and	fairly	obvious	list,	
but	perhaps	some	of	my	rights	are	cultural	not	intrinsic.		There	also	are	probably	
others	that	I	should	have	included.			The	second	issue	is	to	consider	further	how	we	
balance	interests	once	we	have	speciﬁed	them.		In	the	discussion	above	I	have	
suggested	that	if	any	of	the	intrinsic	rights	are	violated,	then	the	acAon	is	morally	
impermissible.		The	Max	Schrems	case	seemed	to	suit	that	inference.		There	are	
however	other	instances	in	which	we	might	want	to	violate	a	right	because	another	
right	is	more	important.		For	example	would	we	hesitate	to	violate	the	online	privacy	
right	of	a	terrorist	using	Facebook	to	plot	murder? 		This	is	a	simple	example,	but	23
there	are	undoubtedly	others	in	between	these	two	examples,	that	are	more	complex	
to	consider.			
So	while	the	framework	of	the	contextual	sphere	provides	some	addiAonal	reasoning	
for	why	parAcular	interests	are	valid	in	any	parAcular	case,	I	would	suggest	that	there	
is	probably	no	simple	formula	to	apply.		This	doesn't	seem	counter-intuiAve	or	
incorrect	to	me.		If	moral	problems	were	solvable	by	equaAons	they	wouldn't	really	be	
moral	problems	at	all,	they	would	be	mathemaAcal	problems.		So,	in	the	end,		it	not	
surprising	that	a	need	for	pracAcal	wisdom,	or	Phronesis,	in	the	form	of	a	judicious	
weighing	of	moral	interests	conAnues	to	apply	to	digital	problems	posed	by	ICT.	
	Even	this	case	is	not	as	simple	as	it	seems.		Apple	is,	as	at	February		2016,	refusing	to	accede	to	an	FBI	23
request	for	Apple	to	amend	the	operaAng	system	of	an	iPhone,	so	that	the	FBI	can	gain	access	to	the	
records	of	the	San	Bernadino	killer,	ciAng	data	security	concerns	in	Cook,	T.	(2016)	A	message	to	our	
customers,	16	February,	URL=<h*p://www.apple.com/customer-le*er/>
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